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Personal background 
I graduated in 1987 with a First Class Honours degree in History from Emmanuel College, 
Cambridge University. After a period of employment in voluntary sector organisations in the 
UK and the Philippines, the first phase of my career spanned 14 years (1991-2005) as a radio 
and online journalist, journalism trainer, editor and commissioner in the BBC World Service. 
Among other roles, from 1999-2004, I edited the daily news and current affairs radio 
programme East Asia Today. I gained first-hand experience of reporting on, or coordinating 
coverage of, events with a strong human rights dimension in authoritarian (or recently 
authoritarian) states such as China, North Korea, Burma, Laos, Indonesia and the Philippines.  
 
In 2005, I left the BBC in order to pursue a new career in academic research and 
teaching in the field of human rights. In 2006, I passed the MSc Human Rights at the London 
School of Economics with Distinction. My intention in taking the MSc was to build on my 
experience of reporting (and voluntary activism) on human rights issues by exploring the 
historical and philosophical origins of human rights and their potential to influence policy 
and animate social movements, through both the legal process and other forms of social 
action. I was aware of the prominence of human rights in the UK, and in particular the 
purported tension between human rights and public security in the context of the ‘war on 
terror’. I was struck by the disjuncture between the ubiquity and near incontestability of the 
human rights discourse internationally and its increasingly contentious profile in the UK. I 
was attracted by the inter-disciplinary nature of the MSc because I consider that the subject of 
human rights is strengthened when it extends beyond the legal sphere and engages, as my 
work has subsequently done, with disciplines such as social policy and democratic theory.  
 
From 2006, I worked for four years as an independent consultant. Initially, my 
consultancies were in the field of media and communications; I undertook research, 
evaluations, training and teaching for, among others, the United Nations Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation; Polis (the centre for the study of journalism and society at LSE), the 
BBC, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and the 
Catholic Fund for Overseas Development. Over time, I successfully developed bids for and 
completed research projects in the fields of human rights, with the first research outputs being 
published in 2009. Several of these were conducted jointly with the Human Rights and Social 
Justice Research Institute at London Metropolitan University.  
 
In June 2010, I joined the Institute as a Senior Research Fellow. In January 2013, I 
moved to Middlesex University along with my colleague Professor Philip Leach and the 
European Human Rights Advocacy Centre.  The publications submitted for this PhD 
originate from research conducted while I was an independent consultant and while employed 
at London Metropolitan University. 
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Abstract 
The premise of my research is an understanding of human rights not only as a technical, legal 
discourse but also as a set of standards and principles which, when applied outside the courts, 
provide a framework for decision-making, a vehicle for social and organisational change, and 
a basis for moral, as well as legal, claims upon the exercise of power. My research proceeds 
within the conceptual framework provided by recent theory conceiving of a democratic legal 
order which includes human rights as a ‘culture of justification’ - a culture in which exercises 
of power, or failures to exercise power, which impinge upon human rights require reasoned 
public justification that is open to independent scrutiny. 
 
In this statement I divide my research into two strands. The first concerns the 
application of human rights standards and principles in public services. Its distinct 
contribution lies in the use of empirical research methods to explore how, and with what 
results, public authorities have embedded human rights standards and principles in decision-
making since the enactment of the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998. This inquiry contributes 
to the emergent understanding of what constitutes a ‘human rights culture’ in public services, 
in both empirical and normative terms. I identify factors that tend either to encourage or 
inhibit the systematic application of human rights at the levels of both individuated and 
corporate decision-making. I conclude that a human rights culture has largely failed to 
materialise among public authorities. However, I identify variation between the nations of the 
UK (with more explicit adoption of human rights standards in the devolved nations) and 
between public authorities (with a few that demonstrate what an overtly ‘rights-respecting’ 
service looks like). I evaluate the evidence that may be adduced as to the impact of human 
rights in public services and propose how evaluative work might proceed in the future. 
 
The second strand of my research concerns the political discourse surrounding the HRA 
and, in particular, initiatives to create a new UK bill of rights. I identify principles and 
methods that have been used to create bills of rights in comparable jurisdictions, situating 
these within the post-war trend towards ‘process-driven constitutionalism’. I evaluate bills of 
rights processes in the UK in the light of this experience. I conclude that conditions for 
reform of human rights law in the UK are deeply unfavourable and that the consultative 
processes pursued by successive governments are ill-designed to achieve democratic 
legitimacy for the project. My research establishes that dissensus on human rights in the UK 
traverses the ‘fault lines’ of profound social and political antagonisms. These include the 
relationship between the individual and the community, commonly invoked through the lens 
of ‘rights and responsibilities’; between the nation state and Europe; and between parliament 
and the courts. Human rights have also become a prime venue for the negotiation of religious 
and cultural differences. Within this turbulent context, my research proposes ways of 
advancing debate about human rights such that it meets the requirements of open justification. 
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Guide to context statement 
 
Part 1 of this statement introduces my research in relation to the conceptual frameworks to 
which it connects; the provenance of my publications and the methodology employed. Part 2 
outlines the political and legal context in which I conducted my research.  
 
Structured around the two principal strands of my research, parts 3 and 4 provide a 
synoptic account of its main themes and findings and explain its contribution to the socio-
legal study of human rights. 
 
I draw some overall conclusions of my research in part 5 and in part 6, I explain my 
current research and how I wish to develop my research interests in the future.    
 
While the statement focuses principally on the findings of my research at the time of 
publication, I have also taken the opportunity to update aspects of it in order to show where 
subsequent developments either reinforce my findings or, conversely, where there are 
grounds to think that the findings might need to be revised in the light of new evidence and/or 
where further research is required to determine whether such revision might be necessary.    
 
Several of my publications have been co-authored and/or co-researched with others. 
For concision, I do not refer to this co-authorship every time that I refer to a specific 
publication. Annex B sets out in detail the division of labour with respect to the various co-
authored or co-researched publications.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The research outputs submitted for this PhD form a coherent body of work published between 
2009 and 2013 examining the implementation and impact – broadly defined – of the Human 
Rights Act (HRA) 1998 following its enactment across the UK in 2000. My research 
combines empirical research with normative argument, thereby making a distinctive 
contribution to the socio-legal study of human rights in the UK.  
 
Below, I introduce my research in relation to: the conceptual approaches to which it 
connects (section 1.1); the provenance of my publications (section 1.2); and the methodology 
employed (section 1.3). 
 
1.1  Conceptual framework 
The premise of my research is an understanding of human rights not only as a technical, legal 
discourse but also as a set of standards and principles which, when applied outside the 
courtroom, provide a framework for decision-making, a vehicle for social and organisational 
change, and a basis for moral (as well as legal) claims upon the exercise of power. My 
principal interest is in the processes by which human rights standards and principles are 
‘translated’ into the realisation of rights. My research encompasses the application of human 
rights standards and principles in public policy and the design and delivery of public services 
as well as the way in which human rights are invoked in wider political discourse.  
 
My starting point, then, is a political conception of human rights which understands 
rights as substantive norms that establish ‘the social and political conditions of a decent 
society [and] … the basic aspects of a dignified life for individuals and groups’;1 that may 
demand not only limitations on state action but also positive and systematic action by a wide 
range of actors,2 and that invite deliberation and argument outside, as well as inside, the 
courts.3 From this point of departure, my research connects in particular to theory which 
explores the interaction between the various branches of the state in the protection and 
                                                          
1
 A. Sathanapally (2012) Beyond Disagreement: Open Remedies in Human Rights Adjudication (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press), p. 1.  For influential accounts of the political (as opposed to natural rights) conception 
of human rights, see: C. Beitz (2009) The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press); T. Pogge 
(2008) World Poverty and Human Rights, Second Edition (Cambridge: Polity); J. Rawls (1999) The Law of 
Peoples (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press); H. Shue (1980) Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and 
US Foreign Policy, Second Edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
2
 See, e.g., S. Fredman (2008) Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press).  
3
 A. Sen (2004) ‘Elements of a Theory of Human Rights’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 32(4):  315.     
2 
 
fulfilment of human rights and thus, in turn, the broader relationship between the legal and 
political spheres and between human rights and democracy. 
 
In this section, I outline the (overlapping) conceptual approaches which have helped my 
thinking to evolve and explain how my research connects to them. For the purposes of this 
statement, I have drawn on recent conceptual literature as well as that which predates my 
publications. In this sense, the frameworks elaborated in this section are in part a 
retrospective analysis of my research, as well as an explanation of the conceptual approach 
which will inform my current and future research.  
 
I examine (i) the development of theoretical approaches which seek to transcend the 
traditional divide in scholarship between legal and political constitutionalism; (ii) the concept 
of law as a ‘culture of justification’; and (iii) the notion of ‘inter-institutional collaboration’ in 
the protection and fulfilment of human rights. Finally, (iv), I examine briefly the state of 
debate in the UK in relation to these conceptual approaches.    
 
(i) The issue of who decides 
In normative terms, the divide in public law thought between legal and political 
constitutionalism may be outlined as follows: legal constitutionalists champion the judicial 
model of rights protection since otherwise, they argue, the rights of individuals and minorities 
are placed at the mercy of transient and potentially irrational or unjust legislative majorities 
or executive dictat.4 Political constitutionalists, on the other hand, doubt the legitimacy of 
justiciable bills of rights, because they remove from the sphere of democratic contestation 
matters (such as the meaning and scope of rights) which are inescapably contestable and hand 
them over to unaccountable judges.5 Bellamy observes that both kinds of constitutionalism in 
fact allow for a balance to be struck: different forms of legal constitutionalism give greater or 
lesser weight to the legislature and popular sovereignty, in deciding constitutional questions, 
and different forms of political constitutionalism allow greater or lesser degrees of judicial 
                                                          
4
 See, e.g., T. R. S. Allan (1994) Law, Liberty and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press); V. Bogdanor (2009) The New British Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing) 
Chapter 3; R. Dworkin (1996) Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth); T. Hickman (2005) ‘In Defence 
of the Legal Constitution’ University of Toronto Law Journal 55(4): 981; J. Jowell (2000) ‘Beyond the Rule of 
Law: Towards Constitutional Judicial Review’ Public Law Winter: 671. 
5
 R Bellamy (2007) Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionalism of Democracy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); T. Campbell, K. D. Ewing and A. Tomkins (2010) The Legal 
Protection of Human Rights: Sceptical Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press); A. Tomkins (2005) Our 
Republican Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing); M. Tushnet (1999) Taking the Constitution Away from the 
Courts (Princeton: Princeton University Press); J. Waldron (2009) ‘The Core of the Case Against Judicial 
Review’, Yale Law Journal 115: 1346; G. Webber (2009) The Negotiable Constitution: On the Limitation of 
Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).  
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independence and discretion.6 Normatively speaking, the crux of the divide is where ultimate 
supremacy for human rights adjudication should lie. For legal constitutionalists, the legal 
context and independence of courts give them the advantage in exercising impartial reasoning 
about rights; for political constitutionalists, the deliberative attributes of legislatures and their 
greater institutional capacity, coupled with the accountability of legislators to citizens, make 
them the superior forum.7  
 
The role of legislatures in relation to the protection of fundamental rights has 
traditionally been far less theorised than that of courts. Yet in the past two decades, interest 
has grown among both legal scholars and political scientists in the role of the legislature in 
determining what rights require and how they are to be balanced both against each other and 
other public policy objectives. This literature has engaged with both the theory and practice 
of the development (or attempted development) since the early 1980s of national bills of 
rights in the common law world.8 Some of this literature advocates parliamentary scrutiny of 
law and policy for human rights compatibility as an alternative to judicial review for such 
compatibility, arguing (in line with the political constitutionalist position outlined above) that 
it is both a more effective and more legitimate way of protecting rights.9 Other accounts, 
while sharing the concern to avoid a judicial monopoly on determining the meaning and 
scope of human rights, are more concerned with how, within a democratic legal order, bills of 
rights might be structured so as to ensure the engagement of both the judiciary and the elected 
branches of government in the interpretation and application of fundamental rights norms.10 
There is variation within this literature as to the extent to which is purely normative or also 
empirical and as to the particular scope of judicial and legislative roles proposed or described.  
 
                                                          
6
 R. Bellamy (2011) ‘Political Constitutionalism and the Human Rights Act’, International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 9(1): 86.  
7
 Contrast, e.g. D. Dyzenhaus (2009) ‘Are legislatures good at morality? Or better at it than the courts?’ 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 7(1): 46 and J. Waldron (2009) ‘Judges as Moral Reasoners’ 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 7(1): 2.  
8
 Early accounts include S. Gardbaum (2001) ‘The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism’ American 
Journal of Comparative Law 49: 707 and J. Waldron (1999) Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press).      
9
 See, e.g., T. Campbell, J. Goldsworthy and A. Stone (eds) (2006) Protecting Rights Without a Bill of Rights 
(Aldershot, UK: Ashgate); C. Evans and S. Evans (2006) ‘Legislative Scrutiny Committees and Parliamentary 
Conceptions of Human Rights’ Public Law Winter: 785; Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts 
as above n 5; Waldron, Law and Disagreement as above n 8.  
10
 For a useful summary, see M. Hunt, H. Hooper and P. Yowell (2012), Parliaments and Human Rights: 
Redressing the Democratic Deficit, AHRC Public Policy Series No. 5, pp.14-17. See also J. Hiebert (2006) 
‘Parliamentary Bills of Rights: An Alternative Model?’ Modern Law Review 69(1):7; J. Hiebert (2004) ‘New 
Constitutional Ideas: Can New Parliamentary Models Resist Judicial Dominance when Interpreting Rights?’ 
Texas Law Review 82(7):1963. 
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Gardbaum’s ‘new Commonwealth’11  model traces the historical development of bill of 
rights in Canada, New Zealand and the UK, arguing that each affirms a model of 
parliamentary democracy that consciously rejects the American model of constitutionalism 
with its perceived excess of judicial power and ‘places the representative legislature, at least 
symbolically, at the apex of government’.12 Erdos similarly explores the shared constitutional 
heritage of bills of rights in the ‘Westminster world’.13 A related concept is that of Tushnet’s 
‘weak-form’ judicial review; this approach is more conceptual than historical and emphasises 
the similarities between bills of rights which are structured in various ways so as to empower 
legislatures to provide constitutional interpretations which differ from or alter interpretations 
made by the courts, in contrast to the US-style ‘strong-form’ model, in which fundamental 
rights are entrenched as supreme law.14 Straddling these approaches is the ubiquitous 
metaphor of an institutional ‘dialogue’ between the judiciary and the elected branches, in 
which each participates in an iterative process of decision-making.15 The dialogic approach 
still leaves significant room for variation, particularly as to whether a national model of rights 
protection permits the legislature to decide not only how to respond to judicial interpretations 
of rights but also whether to respond.16 Yet, in all its varieties, the ‘new dialogue scholarship’ 
(as Sathanapally terms it) accepts the need for interaction between the judiciary and the 
elected branches and eschews the ‘either/or’ dichotomy between parliamentary sovereignty 
and judicial supremacy.17   
  
My research proceeds within this broad conceptual framework in which the three main 
branches of government – and, as I argue in section (iii) below, an even wider circle of actors 
- have legitimate and necessary roles to play in the shared enterprise of protecting and 
fulfilling human rights. In particular, my research connects to two closely-related ideas that 
                                                          
11
 Gardbaum, ‘The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism’ as above n 8. See also S. Gardbaum (2010) 
‘Reassessing the New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism’, International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 8: 167.  
12
 Sathanapally, Beyond Disagreement, as above n 1, p. 13.   
13
 D. Erdos (2010) Delegating Rights Protection: The Rise of Bills of Rights in the Westminster World (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press). 
14
 M. Tushnet (2003) ‘Alternative Forms of Judicial Review’ Michigan Law Review 101(8): 2781. 
15
 T. Hickman (2005) ‘Constitutional Dialogue, Constitutional Theories and the Human Rights Act 1998’ Public 
Law Summer: 306;  C.R.G. Murray (2013) ‘The Continuation of Politics, by Other Means: Judicial Dialogue 
under the Human Rights Act 1998’ in R. Masterman and I. Leigh (eds) The United Kingdom’s Statutory Bill of 
Rights: Constitutional and Comparative Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press).  
16
 Sathanapally, Beyond Disagreement, as above n 1, Chapter 2. See also G. Phillipson (2013) ‘The Human 
Rights Act, Dialogue and Constitutional Principles’ in Masterman and Leigh (eds) The United Kingdom’s 
Statutory Bill of Rights, as above n 15. 
17
 Sathanapally, Beyond Disagreement, as above n 1, p.38. 
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are integral to the ‘shared enterprise’ proposition: that of law as a ‘culture of justification’ 
and that of ‘inter-institutional collaboration’.    
 
(ii) Law as a culture of justification 
Building on the work of South African scholar, Etienne Mureinik,18 Hunt defines a culture of 
justification as one in which, 
 
… all exercises of power which impinge upon fundamental rights, interests or values 
require public justification by reference to reasons, that is, rational explanations for 
why a particular action or decision has been taken, or why there has been an omission 
to act.19 
 
This approach rejects arguments which are based upon formalistic notions of competing 
sovereignties since, as Hunt argues, such notions bear little relation to the way in which 
‘public power is now dispersed and shared between several layers of constitutional actors, all 
of which profess an identical commitment to a set of values which can loosely be termed 
democratic constitutionalism’.20 Rather, Hunt ventures, there is a need to reconfigure public 
law towards more substantive concepts of value and reason as a basis for justification.21 
 
As elaborated by Dyzenhaus, Mureinik’s conception of the culture of justification rests 
on two ideals: participation and accountability.22 The first is required because people whose 
rights and interests are affected or determined by a public policy should have the opportunity 
to participate in its formation. The second is required because the powerful are prone to 
monopolise such opportunities for participation. Hence, the principle of accountability - one 
which requires the justification of official decisions - must come into play by invoking the 
scrutiny of a review body independent of the official or agency, in order to protect the 
interests of people who find it hard to access participatory processes. For Mureinik, then, 
decisions that invoke the authority of ‘the people’ are only legitimate if they can be shown to 
be justifiable.23 The possibility of judicial scrutiny forces the authors of public policy ‘to 
articulate their reasons for dismissing the objections and the alternatives to the programme, 
                                                          
18
 See especially E. Mureinik (1994) 'A Bridge to Where?: Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights' South African 
Journal on Human Rights 10: 31. 
19
 M. Hunt (2007) ‘Reshaping Constitutionalism’ in J. Morison, K. McEvoy and G. Anthony (eds) Judges, 
Transition and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 470.    
20
 Hunt, ‘Reshaping Constitutionalism’, as above n 19, p. 468. 
21
 Hunt, ‘Reshaping Constitutionalism’, as above n 19, p. 470. 
22
 D. Dyzenhaus (1998) ‘Law as Justification: Etienne Mureinik’s Conception of Legal Culture’ South African 
Journal on Human Rights 14: 11, pp. 34-35.  
23
 Dyzenhaus, ‘Law as Justification: Etienne Mureinik’s Conception of Legal Culture’, as above n 22, p. 27. 
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and precisely to articulate the reasons that link evidence to decision, premises to 
conclusion’.24 
 
Within such a culture of politico-legal justification, as Feldman terms it, rights are 
viewed as facilitative rather than constraining of democracy.25 On this account, human rights 
and democracy do not stand in opposition to each other but, rather, debate shifts to the 
appropriate institutional machinery and modes of argument by which, collaboratively, the 
different arms of the state may fulfil their complementary roles. The concept of law as a 
culture of justification thus opens up for analysis a range of empirical questions such as 
whether and how a legal instrument like the HRA changes the structures of justification used 
by legislators or other decision-makers to explain their actions or omissions.26  
 
My research connects to this idea in two ways. First, I view the concept of law as a 
culture of justification as setting a standard for the conduct of debate about public policies 
which implicate rights - including, naturally, public policy about human rights, such as, in the 
UK context, proposals to reconfigure the legal architecture for human rights protection. My 
research critically evaluates efforts by successive administrations to create a new bill of rights 
for the UK, drawing both on comparable experience from other common law jurisdictions 
and normative arguments about the relationship between human rights and different 
conceptions of democracy. Further, my research analyses contemporary critiques both of the 
HRA and the UK’s relationship with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and 
assesses the basis of their justification.            
 
 Secondly, my research has involved empirical investigation of the application of human 
rights standards and principles at the level of policy-making and in the operational delivery of 
services. In this sense, I have examined how the culture of justification has played out at the 
level of the individual public authority or service as well as in the wider political realm.   
 
(iii) Inter-institutional collaboration 
I established in (i) above that my research proceeds within a conceptual framework that views 
the protection and fulfilment of human rights as a shared endeavour of all branches of the 
state. The question remains as to how this joint responsibility is to be fulfilled, both with 
respect to its effectiveness and to the normatively sensitive allocation of authority. The 
                                                          
24
 E. Mureinik (1992) 'Beyond a Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in the Constitution' South African 
Journal on Human Rights 8: 468, pp. 472-73. 
25
 D. Feldman (2011) ‘“Which In Your Case You Have Not Got”: Constitutionalism at Home and Abroad’ 
Current Legal Problems 64: 117.  
26
 Such empirical studies are rare. See especially Hunt, Hooper and Yowell, Parliaments and Human Rights, as 
above n 10.  
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concept of inter-institutional collaboration27 arises in the context of literature which examines 
the relative advantages and drawbacks of the courts, as compared with other institutions, as a 
mechanism for solving problems relating to fundamental rights. Proponents of the 
‘institutional approach’ reject formalist notions of demarcating separate and autonomous 
functions for each branch of government; rather, in examining the judicial role, they ask how 
the division of labour between courts and other institutions should best be achieved.  
 
Several authors have sought to refine this discussion by means of a concept of judicial 
deference to elected institutions.28 A common element of their approach is that judges should 
take an expansive view of what is appropriate for judicial resolution, rather than regarding 
some areas of policy (such as national security or resource allocation) as inherently 
inappropriate for adjudication. From this perspective, human rights cut across all substantive 
areas of decision-making, and there are no hard boundaries between legal and political 
redress. Another dimension of this approach is that judges should assign weight, and 
sometimes considerable weight, to the views of decision-makers in other institutions to whom 
the law has delegated policy-making and interpretative roles.   
 
Some,29 but not all,30 advocates of the practice of judicial restraint have gone further to 
elaborate a doctrine of judicial restraint structured around certain explicit principles. Notably, 
Kavanagh distinguishes between ‘minimal’ and ‘substantial’ judicial deference to the elected 
branches.31 Minimal deference is always due as a matter of respect, while substantial 
deference has to be earned by the elected branches and is justified only where a court 
considers itself to suffer from particular institutional shortcomings with regard to the matter 
                                                          
27
 J. King (2012) Judging Social Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 139. 
28
 A. Kavanagh (2010) ‘Defending Deference in Public Law and Constitutional Theory’ (2010) Law Quarterly 
Review 126: 222; A. Kavanagh (2009) Constitutional Review under the Human Rights Act (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press); King, Judging Social Rights, as above n 27; M. Hunt (2003) ‘Sovereignty’s 
Blight: Why Contemporary Public Law Needs the Concept of “Due Deference”’ in N. Bamforth and P. Leyland 
(eds) Public Law in a Multi-layered Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing); E. Palmer (2007) Judicial Review, 
Socio-Economic Rights and the Human Rights Act (Oxford: Hart Publishing), Chapter 4; A. Young (2009) ‘In 
Defence of  Due Deference’ Modern Law Review 72: 554. 
29
 For arguments in favour of a specific doctrine of judicial restraint, see: Kavanagh, ‘Defending Deference in 
Public Law and Constitutional Theory’, as above n 28; Young, ‘In Defence of Due Deference’ as above n 28; 
King, Judging Social Rights, as above n 27, Part II. See also the model of proportionality proposed by Brady, 
which integrates deference within the multi-stage proportionality test applied by the courts to assess the 
Convention-compatibility of all executive and legislative action; A. Brady (2012) Proportionality and 
Deference under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).  
30
 For arguments against a doctrine of judicial restraint, see: T.R.S. Allan (2010) ‘Deference, Defiance, and 
Doctrine: Defining the Limits of Judicial Review’ University of Toronto Law Journal 60(1): 41; T. Hickman 
(2012) Public Law after the Human Rights Act (Oxford: Hart Publishing). 
31
 Kavanagh, Constitutional Review under the Human Rights Act, as above n 28, p. 181.   
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in question. These are cases in which a court judges parliament, the executive or another 
decision-maker to have either more institutional competence; more expertise, and/or greater 
legitimacy to assess a particular issue.32 King pulls in the same direction in his examination 
of the capacity and legitimacy of the judicial process as an institutional mechanism for rights 
adjudication.33 King proposes what he terms a ‘contextual institutional approach’ to judicial 
restraint, structured around certain principles, in which the judicial role is not a privileged 
form of higher law, situated above common politics, but rather ‘one institutional method of 
problem-solving acting in concert with other institutions’.34 King endorses Kavanagh’s 
notion of ‘inter-institutional comity’35 but, recognising that comity can exist between wholly 
separate institutions, extends it to include a more active relationship, which he terms inter-
institutional collaboration.36  
 
I find the concept of inter-institutional collaboration attractive for several reasons. 
Compared to inter-institutional comity, it implies both a more dynamic and a more cohesive 
relationship between the various actors. From this perspective, parliament, the executive and 
the courts are ‘part of a joint-enterprise for the betterment of society’ and ‘conflicts between 
them are subsumed within one vision of governance’.37 Further, the concept has important 
consequences for how we evaluate the impact, value and significance of the HRA (and 
comparable justiciable bills of rights). It implies that the impact of the HRA is to be 
calculated by considering the collective behaviour of all types of institution that act (or 
attempt to act) to the public good under its influence in a way, or to an extent, that they did 
not do before it was enacted. Following this approach, in my research, I conceptualise these 
would-be agents of collaboration as including not only the courts, parliament and the 
executive but also other types of public authority such as regulators, inspectorates, 
ombudsmen, local authorities and other providers of public services. Moreover, they include 
not only the directors of public authorities but also operational staff who manage or deliver 
‘frontline’ services, since all these actors are ultimately bound to act compatibility with the 
rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).     
 
This approach has led me to examine not only the impact of judicial review on the 
behaviour of public authorities but also the more nuanced ways in which human rights 
standards and principles influence decision-making and catalyse organisational change. I 
view the latter dimension as especially significant since only a tiny proportion of meritorious 
                                                          
32
 Kavanagh, Constitutional Review under the Human Rights Act, as above n 28, p. 182. 
33
 King, Judging Social Rights, as above n 27.   
34
 King, Judging Social Rights, as above n 27, p. 150. 
35
 Kavanagh, Constitutional Review under the Human Rights Act, as above n 28, p.180. 
36
 King, Judging Social Rights, as above n 27, p. 139. 
37
 King, Judging Social Rights, as above n 27, p. 139. 
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claims reach the courts. In particular, people who experience poverty and social exclusion 
experience multiple barriers from asserting their rights using legal process. As Clements 
observes, these include low awareness about human rights; an ingrained sense of 
powerlessness; fear of retribution; barriers inherent in the civil justice system itself, including 
its cost, adversarial nature and inaccessibility to (among others) people with physical or 
learning disabilities and people who are chronically poor or homeless; and a lack of cohesion 
and resources to instigate group action when administrative or corporate decisions require 
collective, rather than individual, challenge.38 Such barriers to access to justice are increasing 
with the removal in England and Wales of publicly-funded legal advice and representation 
from the majority of civil law claims concerning family, immigration, employment, debt, 
welfare and education matters;39 proposals to restrict criminal legal aid;40 and measures (and 
proposed measures) to curb applications for judicial review.41 In view of these multiplying 
obstacles to access to justice, I suggest that the transformative potential of human rights in the 
UK context lies increasingly in the extent to which they influence the design and delivery of 
services and the habitual frameworks of decision-making of those that deliver them.  
 
It is only by examining these diverse actors and types of impact that one can begin to 
understand how far, as King asks, ‘justiciable rights can spur better political and 
administrative action’ [emphasis in original] and litigation (or the possibility of litigation) 
‘can serve as a gadfly to further development in many subtle ways’.42 Indeed, the HRA is an 
excellent test case for assessing, using social scientific research methods, whether the 
creation of judicial remedies (as opposed to new rights) can drive political actors and 
complex bureaucracies alike to embed human rights considerations into their decision-
making.43   
 
(iv)   The state of debate in the UK   
Hunt, Hooper and Yowell identify an emerging consensus in the UK, both in academic and 
political circles, ‘in favour of human rights and the desirability of their protection by legal 
instruments’.44 They note, for example, that many critics of the HRA are nevertheless in 
                                                          
38
 L. Clements (2005) ‘Winners and Losers’ Journal of Law and Society 32(1): 34. See also R. Costigan and P.A. 
Thomas (2005) ‘The Human Rights Act: A View from Below’ Journal of Law and Society 32(1):  51; J. Watson 
(2002), Something for Everyone: The impact of the Human Rights Act and the need for a Human Rights 
Commission (London: British Institute of Human Rights). 
39
 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012.  
40
 Ministry of Justice (2013) Transforming Legal Aid; Next Steps (London: Ministry of Justice) 
41
 Ministry of Justice (2013) Judicial Review: Proposals for Further Reform CM 8703 (London: Ministry of 
Justice).  
42
 King, Judging Social Rights, as above n 27, p. 54.  
43
 King, Judging Social Rights, as above n 27, p. 53.  
44
 Hunt, Hooper and Yowell, Parliaments and Human Rights, as above n 10, pp. 10-11.   
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favour of a new UK bill of rights, which would maintain a significant role for the courts.45 
Some academic proponents of political constitutionalism have likewise accepted that courts 
have a legitimate role to play in adjudicating about rights, at least within certain constraints. 46 
However, this consensus around what I have called the ‘shared enterprise’ proposition is not 
unanimous.47 Moreover, so far as it exists, it is built on unstable foundations. As Hunt 
observes, constitutional discourse in the UK is prone to lurch between democratic positivism 
and liberal constitutionalism, each being invoked (sometimes by the same judge or 
commentator) to justify a particular decision at a particular moment.48  
 
 These inconsistencies highlight, for Hunt, the absence in the UK of an ‘overarching 
coherent vision of democratic constitutionalism’ which would permit a reconciliation of these 
apparently contradictory foundational commitments without resort to the language of 
sovereignty.49 In the absence of such a coherent vision, political debate about human rights in 
the UK continues to be dominated by a remarkable degree of dissensus about who is the final 
arbiter on matters of human rights, the courts or parliament. This dissensus is fuelled by a 
small number of judgments which have excited persistent controversy and has increasingly 
been framed as a critique of the ECtHR and its impact on the UK. In part 4, I examine the 
nature of these controversies and explain how my publications have analysed and responded 
to them.     
 
1.2  Overview of publications  
In this section, I provide an overview of the publications submitted for this PhD by Public 
Works. I introduce (i) the type and of provenance of the publications; (ii) the quality control 
mechanisms to which they were subject; and (iii) their geographical scope. 
 
 
 
                                                          
45
 See, e.g. remarks by Dominic Raab MP, who criticises the purported judicial activism of the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) and its impact on the UK, yet advocates a new Bill of Rights under which UK courts 
would have stronger powers, including the power to strike down legislation which is incompatible with a ‘core’ 
(but unspecified) list of fundamental freedoms; see ‘The conversation: Judging rights from wrong’, The 
Guardian, 8 October 2011. 
46
 For example, in ‘Political Constitutionalism and the Human Rights Act’ (as above n 6), Bellamy ventures 
that, by virtue of its institutional design, the HRA, far from relinquishing supremacy for rights adjudication from 
the legislature to the courts, in fact reinforces political constitutionalism.   
47
 See, e.g., K. Ewing (2012) ‘Doughty Defenders of the Human Rights Act’ in N. Kang-Riou, J. Milner and S. 
Nayak (eds) (2012), Confronting the Human Rights Act: contemporary themes and perspectives (London: 
Routledge). 
48
 Hunt, ‘Reshaping Constitutionalism’, as above n 19, p. 469. 
49
 Hunt, ‘Reshaping Constitutionalism’, as above n 19, p. 469. 
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(i) Type and provenance of publications 
My publications are listed in Annex A. Several of them were co-authored with, or include 
contributions by, others, as explained in Annex B. The publications comprise:  
 
• Five research reports commissioned by the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission: 
o Human Rights in Britain since the Human Rights Act 1998: A Critical Review 
(hereafter, Critical Review);50   
o Evaluating the Impact of Selected Cases under the Human Rights Act 1998 on 
Public Service Provision (hereafter, Evaluating the Impact of Selected Cases 
under the HRA);51 
o Developing a Bill of Rights for the UK (hereafter, Developing a Bill of 
Rights);52  
o The UK and the European Court of Human Rights;53 and  
o Religion or Belief, Equality and Human Rights in England and Wales 
(hereafter, Religion or Belief report);54 
 
• A research report commissioned by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation: 
o Poverty, Inequality and Human Rights: Do Human Rights Frameworks Make 
a Difference? (hereafter, Poverty, Inequality and Human Rights);55 
   
• A research report commissioned by the Department of Health: 
o A Guide to Evaluating Human Rights-Based Interventions in Health and 
Social Care (hereafter, Evaluating Human Rights-Based Interventions).56 
 
                                                          
50
 A. Donald, P. Leach and J. Watson (2009) Human rights in Britain since the Human Rights Act 1998: A 
Critical Review, Research Report 28 (Manchester: Equality and Human Rights Commission).  
51
 A. Donald and E. Mottershaw (2009) Evaluating the Impact of Selected Cases under the Human Rights Act 
1998 on Public Service Provision (unnumbered) (Manchester: Equality and Human Rights Commission). 
52
 A. Donald with the assistance of P. Leach and A. Puddephatt (2010) Developing a Bill of Rights for the UK, 
Research Report 51 (Manchester: Equality and Human Rights Commission).  
53
 A. Donald, J. Gordon and P. Leach (2012) The UK and the European Court of Human Rights, Research 
Report 83 (Manchester: Equality and Human Rights Commission).   
54
 A. Donald with the assistance of K. Bennett and P. Leach (2012) Religion or Belief, Equality and Human 
Rights in England and Wales, Research Report 84 (Manchester: Equality and Human Rights Commission). 
55
 A. Donald and E. Mottershaw (2009) Poverty, Inequality and Human Rights: Do Human Rights Frameworks 
Make a Difference? (York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation). 
56
 A. Donald (2012) Evaluating Human Rights-Based Interventions in Health and Social Care (London 
Metropolitan University: Human Rights and Social Justice Research Institute; produced for the Human Rights in 
Healthcare programme of the Department of Health). 
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• Two articles in peer-reviewed journals:  
o ‘Advancing Debate about Religion or Belief, Equality and Human Rights: 
Grounds for Optimism?’ (hereafter, ‘Advancing Debate about Religion or 
Belief’);57 and  
o ‘Evaluating the Impact of Human Rights Litigation on Policy and Practice: A 
Case Study of the UK’ (hereafter ‘Evaluating the Impact of Human Rights 
Litigation’).58 
 
• Two peer-reviewed book chapters:  
o ‘Developing a Bill of Rights for the UK: Lessons from Overseas’ (hereafter 
‘Lessons from Overseas’);59 and 
‘Limits and Achievements of the HRA from the Socio-Economic Point of 
View’ (hereafter, ‘Limits and Achievements of the HRA’).60   
 
Each of the research reports was commissioned following a competitive tendering 
process. Thus, the research briefs were initiated by the commissioning organisations and 
connected to their broader policy work. The Critical Review report was commissioned as the 
scoping study for the EHRC’s statutory Human Rights Inquiry in 2008-09, which framed the 
human rights mandate of the (then) newly-formed Commission. The Critical Review 
identified as a research gap the unexplored impact of human rights legal cases on public 
service provision; the EHRC agreed that this was a research priority and re-engaged the team 
to address it as part of the Human Rights Inquiry, resulting in the report on Evaluating the 
Impact of Selected Cases under the HRA.  
 
Three reports were commissioned to examine specific policy areas of concern to the 
EHRC: respectively, the reports on Religion or Belief; The UK and the European Court of 
Human Rights and Developing a Bill of Rights. The report on Poverty, Inequality and Human 
Rights was commissioned by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF) as part of its broader 
                                                          
57
 A. Donald (2013) ‘Advancing debate about religion or belief, equality and human rights: Grounds for 
optimism?’ Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 2(1): 50. 
58
 A. Donald and E. Mottershaw  (2009) ‘Evaluating the Impact of Human Rights Litigation on Policy and 
Practice: A Case Study of the UK’ Journal of Human Rights Practice 1(3): 339. 
59
 A. Donald (2013) ‘Developing a Bill of Rights for the UK: Lessons from overseas’ in I. Leigh and R. 
Masterman (eds) The UK’s Statutory Bill of Rights: Constitutional and Comparative Perspectives (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press) 281. 
60
 A. Donald and E. Mottershaw (2012) ‘Limits and achievements of the HRA from the socio-economic point of 
view: the HRA and Poverty’, in Kang-Riou, Milner and Nayak (eds), Confronting the Human Rights Act, as 
above n 47: 141. 
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‘Public Interest in Poverty’ research programme, which aimed to understand and influence 
public attitudes towards and media reporting of poverty in the UK. In view of their 
engagement with contemporary policy questions, each of the research reports contains 
recommendations directed at various actors and/or elaborates principles or broader 
approaches to policy which are congruent with human rights and equality standards.  
 
While the commissioning organisations drew up the respective research briefs, in each 
case, my fellow researchers and I substantively determined the scope of the research, as well 
as the detailed methodology. For example, the report on Poverty, Inequality and Human 
Rights, commissioned by JRF, began with an open-ended brief to explore how, and to what 
effect, human rights have been used to address poverty and inequality, without being 
prescriptive as to the geographical remit, methodology, disciplinary approach or scope of the 
research. My co-author and I determined the detailed research questions and methodology in 
order to impose coherence on a potentially vast topic.  
 
The report Evaluating Human Rights-Based Interventions – a manual for health and 
social care practitioners - stands apart from the rest in that combines elements of research and 
content of a more applied nature. I have included it because it is to my knowledge the first 
attempt in the UK to critically analyse both published and unpublished evaluations of human 
rights-based interventions in health and social care and propose methodological approaches 
for future evaluations.    
 
The journal articles and book chapters submitted utilise in various ways the data from 
the research reports. They examine specific research questions in greater depth; apply 
analytical frameworks in new contexts and/or engage critically with the methodology 
employed in the research reports. The article on ‘Advancing Debate about Religion or Belief’, 
drawing on the data in the research report on Religion or Belief, identifies ways of advancing 
public discussion of equality, human rights and religion or belief in Britain, arguing that it 
has been unduly dominated by often partial interpretations of legal cases. The article on 
‘Evaluating the Impact of Human Rights Litigation’ draws on Evaluating the Impact of 
Selected Cases under the HRA and examines the methodological challenges involved in 
determining whether and how human rights judgments influence the policy and practice of 
public authorities. The chapter on ‘Lessons from Overseas’ uses the data in the report on 
Developing a Bill of Rights to critique the remit and operation of the Commission on a Bill of 
Rights, which was created by the coalition government in 2010. The chapter on the ‘Limits 
and Achievements of the HRA’ applies the analytical framework developed in the research 
report Poverty, Inequality and Human Rights to demonstrate the disconnection between two 
significant policy goals of the New Labour administration: on the one hand, to promote a 
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human rights culture and, on the other, to tackle social exclusion and poverty, especially child 
poverty.   
 
(ii) Quality control 
The journal articles and book chapters were subject to the normal process of anonymous 
peer-review. The research reports were also subject to rigorous quality control mechanisms. 
In each case, the commissioning organisation formed a research management team to liaise 
with me and, where relevant, my co-authors. This provided a forum for discussing 
methodological questions, as well as the logistical and other challenges inherent in 
conducting a large number of semi-structured interviews on frequently contentious topics. In 
addition, four of the reports (Religion or Belief; Developing a Bill of Rights; Poverty, 
Inequality and Human Rights; and Critical Review) benefited from the input and scrutiny of 
academic advisers and advisers selected for their professional expertise. Advisers are listed in 
the Acknowledgements pages of the respective reports. For the report on Poverty, Inequality 
and Human Rights, JRF also engaged a 13-strong Project Advisory Group, which scrutinised 
draft chapters and approved the final report. Evaluating Human Rights-Based Interventions 
was subject to review by the departmental lead on human rights in the Department of Health. 
All the research projects (except for Poverty, Inequality and Human Rights) were additionally 
subject to review by the research ethics committee of London Metropolitan University.  
  
(iii) Geographical remit 
In respect of their geographical remit within the UK, the research reports (and the associated 
journal articles/chapters) variously cover England and Wales (Religion or Belief and 
Evaluating the Impact of Selected Cases under the HRA); Britain (Critical Review; 
Evaluating Human Rights-Based Interventions) or the UK as a whole (The UK and the 
European Court of Human Rights; Developing a Bill of Rights; and Poverty, Inequality and 
Human Rights). Interviews, focus groups and research seminars were conducted accordingly 
in England, Wales, Scotland and/or Northern Ireland. My research on public services has 
focused principally on Britain and therefore developments in Northern Ireland are not 
comprehensively reflected in this statement.  
 
Four of the research reports also have a strong regional or international dimension 
(Religion or Belief; The UK and the European Court of Human Rights; Developing a Bill of 
Rights; and Poverty, Inequality and Human Rights). The reports necessarily engage with the 
context of devolution within the UK, in respect both of the political, legal and constitutional 
arrangements in the devolved nations and the evident variations across the UK in how human 
rights are publicly understood, reported and invoked in political discourse.       
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1.3 Methodology    
Each research output describes in detail the methodology followed and appends the research 
tools used (interview and focus group schedules). In this section, I summarise my 
methodological approach and assess its strengths and limitations. 
   
The research reports each used a qualitative methodology: principally semi-structured 
interviews and focus groups. Interviewees and focus group participants were purposively 
sampled according to criteria which are set out in the respective publications. The reports on 
Religion or Belief, Developing a Bill of Rights and Poverty, Inequality and Human Rights 
also involved research seminars which were used to test emerging findings with invited 
participants. While drafting Developing a Bill of Rights, I also used observational methods 
during my attendance at a deliberative event organised in 2009 by the Ministry of Justice as 
part of the Labour Government’s consultation on a Bill of Rights and Responsibilities.  
 
The data were gathered mainly from legal, political and policy actors, as well as 
practitioners within public authorities at different levels of managerial responsibility. In total, 
the six research reports involved around 220 semi-structured interviews, of which I 
conducted more than half. Interviews were conducted both face-to-face and by telephone. 
Interviews and focus groups were recorded and transcribed. In the case of my co-authored 
works, the transcriptions were shared among the research team and discussed on an iterative 
basis. The transcriptions were then analysed and manually coded on the basis of emergent 
themes, including differing perspectives and the reasons for that differentiation. In each case, 
as the analysis developed, I returned continuously to the transcripts in order to verify the 
interpretation placed upon them. The works make extensive use of quotations which illustrate 
key themes and perspectives. Ethical research methods were strictly adhered to in order to 
ensure informed consent from participants, including written consent for each published 
attribution.           
  
In addition, for each of the research reports, I carried out a literature review (and, where 
relevant, a review of case law), either solely or in collaboration with one other researcher. 
The publications make extensive use of ‘grey’ literature and unpublished material supplied by 
public authorities. Each of the reports integrates within thematic chapters both the analysis of 
the primary data and those of the literature/case law review, rather than presenting the 
literature/case law review separately. This approach permitted a detailed analysis and 
contextualisation of the findings of the primary data in terms of how far they advanced or 
contradicted the knowledge gained from the existing literature and/or case law.    
 
The qualitative approach I adopted provides a depth of insight into the views and 
experiences of research participants which quantitative methods would not have yielded. I 
16 
 
have been able to analyse in detail the use of language and normative perspective of 
interviewees, as well as obtaining rich factual data. Qualitative methods also have the 
advantage of permitting interrogation of why interviewees think or act as they do, with 
sensitivity to context and personal experience.  
 
However, there are unavoidable limitations in the use of qualitative methods alone; 
mainly, the difficulty in ensuring that the data obtained is representative of the constituencies 
involved in relation to geography, affiliation, type of service, role or seniority, gender and 
other variables. Each research output required a compromise between depth (e.g. ‘drilling 
down’ in one institution from senior management to frontline staff) and breadth (e.g. 
comparing and contrasting experience between peers in different institutions and gaining the 
view of individuals with a cross-institutional perspective). In some instances, this limited me 
and my co-researchers to taking ‘snapshots’ of practice which could not confidently be 
identified as universal or consistent either within or between institutions. Purposive sampling 
can mitigate but not remove these limitations and the scope of each research project had to be 
delimited, and the research findings qualified, accordingly. My findings are throughout 
inductive rather than deductive, in the sense that they provide strong evidence, rather than 
proof, of certain conclusions.   
 
My research has involved additional methodological challenges. The first was 
presented by the dynamic nature of the subject of human rights in the UK. On occasions, 
substantive legal or political developments occurred during the lifetime of a research project, 
which demanded a flexible and iterative approach. The contentiousness of my research 
themes has also presented difficulties. For example, the Religion or Belief report required 
careful sampling based on transparent criteria in order to reflect the views of a range of 
religion or belief groups, as well as minority perspectives within religion or belief groups and 
those concerned mainly with equality and/or human rights. The sensitivity of this sampling 
process was heightened by the fact that the commissioning organisation, the EHRC, had been 
publicly criticised by several religion or belief groups for alleged bias or ineffectiveness and 
was therefore keen to ensure that certain groups did not feel excluded from participating in 
the research. The selection of interviewees had to be carefully negotiated with the 
Commission to ensure that such considerations did not skew the selection criteria which had 
previously been agreed. Similarly, the reports on The UK and the European Court of Human 
Rights and Developing a Bill of Rights engaged with the political controversy surrounding the 
future of human rights legislation in the UK and required careful sampling of interviewees to 
ensure a balance of perspectives.     
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2. LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT   
 
Before I examine in detail the themes and findings of my research, I will outline the fluid and 
contested context in which it was conducted. 
    
The Human Rights Act received royal assent in November 1998 and came into force 
across the UK in October 2000. The devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland had been bound by the Act from their inception in 1999. The HRA gives 
further effect in UK law to the fundamental rights and freedoms in the ECHR. It makes 
available in UK courts a remedy for breach of a Convention right, without the need to go to 
the ECtHR in Strasbourg.   
 
The enactment of the HRA underpinned a period of substantial constitutional 
adjustment in the UK from the late 1990s, which also saw the devolution of some powers 
from the UK Parliament to the Northern Ireland Assembly,61 the National Assembly for 
Wales62 and the Scottish Parliament.63 Labour ministers proclaimed both a remedial and 
transformative purpose behind the HRA. As one put it: ‘Remedies will be nearer home, and 
… people will seek them ... The result will be the beginning of the strong development of a 
human rights culture in this country’.64 
 
Subsequent statements downplayed the litigious aspect of the HRA amid fears, which 
proved unfounded, of a rash of litigation once the Act came into force.65 As Butler notes, 
government pronouncements became more ‘ambiguous and ambitious’, 66  vaunting the new 
law as a vehicle for both public service modernisation and a broader cultural and moral 
renewal.67 The (then) Home Secretary Jack Straw ventured that the Act, 
                                                          
61
 Northern Ireland Act 1998 
62
 Government of Wales Act 1998 (see also Government of Wales Act 2006, which reformed the Welsh 
Assembly and gave it legislative competence). 
63
 Scotland Act 1998   
64
 Mike O’Brien MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, HC Debs col 1322, 21 
October 1998. 
65
 V. Bondy (2003) The Impact of the Human Rights Act on Judicial Review: An Empirical Research Study 
(London: Public Law Project), Chapter 5.   
66
 F. Butler (2005) ‘Building a Human Rights Culture’ in C. Harvey (ed) Human Rights in the Community: 
Rights as Agents for Change (Oxford: Hart Publishing), p.65.   
67
 See, for example: Human Rights Task Force (2000) A New Era of Rights and Responsibilities: Core 
Guidance for Public Authorities (London: Home Office); Lord Irvine of Lairg, Evidence to the JCHR, 19 March 
2001, JCHR HL 66-ii HC 332-ii; Mike O’Brien MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, HC Debs col 1322, 21 October 1998; Jack Straw MP, Constitution Unit Annual Lecture: Church 
House, 27 October 1999.    
18 
 
 
… confirms an ethical bottom line for public authorities … There’s a new system of 
ethical values here. It’s a system of values which everyone can sign up to. Unifying, 
inclusive and based on common humanity.68  
 
The key provision in the HRA, which laid the foundation for this putative 
transformation of public services, was that which makes it unlawful for any public 
authority,69 or private person exercising public functions,70 to act in a way which is 
incompatible with Convention rights unless primary legislation requires them to act 
otherwise,71 and which provides individuals with remedies if a public authority breaches their 
human rights.72 The implications of the HRA for public service delivery have been 
comparatively neglected in academic literature.73 However, these implications have been 
examined by, among others, UK Government departments;74 national human rights 
institutions in the UK;75 the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR);76 audit, inspectorate, 
                                                          
68
 Jack Straw MP, ‘Building a human rights culture’, address to Civil Service College seminar, 9 December 
1999. 
69
 HRA 1998 s. 6(1) 
70
 HRA 1998 s. 6(3)(b).  
71
 HRA 1998 ss. 6(1) and (2). 
72
 HRA 1998 ss. 7 and 8. 
73
 See, however, L. Clements and R. Morris (2004) ‘The Millennium Blip: Local Authority Responses to the 
Human Rights Act 1998’, in S. Halliday and P. Schmidt (eds) Human Rights Brought Home: Socio-Legal 
Studies of Human Rights in the National Context (Oxford: Hart Publishing); J. Gordon (2010) ‘A developing 
human rights culture in the UK? Case studies of policing’, European Human Rights Law Review 6: 609; Harvey 
(ed) Human Rights in the Community: Rights as Agents for Change, as above n 66. See also publications 
produced by the Human Rights Futures project at the London School of Economics; e.g. its July 2013 briefing 
on ‘Human Rights Act impact on everyday life – some examples’.   
74
 Department of Constitutional Affairs (2006) Review of the Implementation of the Human Rights Act (London: 
DCA); Department of Health (2008) Human Rights in Healthcare: A Framework for Local Action, Second 
edition (London: British Institute of Human Rights and Department of Health); Ministry of Justice (2008) 
Human Rights Insight Project, Ministry of Justice Research Series 1/08 (London: Ministry of Justice). 
75
 See, e.g., Equality and Human Rights Commission (2009) Human Rights Inquiry (London: EHRC); Equality 
and Human Rights Commission (2012) Human Rights Review 2012: How Fair is Britain? An Assessment of 
How Well Public Authorities Protect Human Rights (London: EHRC). The Scottish Human Rights Commission 
has examined the impact of the HRA from various perspectives, e.g. the impact on health and social care; see, 
inter alia: Scottish Human Rights Commission  (2009), Human Rights in a Health Care Setting: Making it Work 
- An Evaluation of a human rights-based approach at The State Hospital (Glasgow: SHRC); ‘Care about 
Rights’ training and awareness programme about embedding human rights in the care of older people: 
http://www.scottishhumanrights.com/careaboutrights/. For research reports produced or commissioned by the 
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, see http://www.nihrc.org/index.php/research-and-
investigations/item/209-research.  
76
 See, inter alia, the following thematic reports of the Joint Committee on Human Rights: (2009) 
Demonstrating respect for rights? A human rights approach to policing protest, Seventh Report of Session 
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regulatory and complaint-handling bodies;77 non-government organisations;78 and policy 
bodies.79 Further, public authorities which have sought explicitly and systematically to apply 
human rights have, in some instances, described and evaluated the impact of this activity 
(Evaluating Human Rights-Based Interventions, Chapter 10).80 In part 3, I explain how my 
research contributes to this literature and to our emergent understanding of what constitutes a 
human rights culture in public services.  
 
As I document in the Critical Review report (Chapter 2), preparations for the coming 
into force of the HRA across the UK included: extensive training for judges; policy reviews 
within central government departments; the establishment of a specialised unit within the 
Home Office81 to oversee implementation and disseminate guidance to public authorities, 
and, crucially, the establishment of a parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights 
(JCHR).82 However, the HRA contained no mechanism to lead the would-be cultural 
renaissance in public services. Plans to create a human rights commission in Britain were 
postponed (the EHRC was finally established in 2007)83 and the role of promoting the Act 
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effectively stayed within the Department for Constitutional Affairs (later renamed the 
Ministry of Justice) and did not extend in any significant way to other government 
departments. Further, as successive JCHR reports deplored, the Labour Government’s 
transformative vision for the Act soon gave way to a narrower and increasingly negative 
political discourse about the Act.84 My publications Critical Review; Evaluating the Impact of 
Selected Cases under HRA and ‘Evaluating the Impact of Human Rights Litigation’ (which 
were published in 2009 and for which the fieldwork was conducted in 2008) found that the 
twin consequences were a corrosive tendency among public authorities to see the HRA in 
narrow, legalistic terms and a failure of the rationale of the Act to take root among 
government departments and public authorities – a finding reinforced by surveys of public 
authorities conducted in the early 2000s.85 However, as I discuss in section 3.7, this picture is 
not uniform across the UK or across all public authorities, and there is scope for new research 
to identify more recent developments in respect of implementation of human rights principles 
and standards.  
 
The HRA was also envisaged as creating a culture of human rights in governance, 
based on the expectation that prospective state actions that implicated rights should be subject 
to scrutiny both of their merits and legitimacy before becoming law, thereby preventing 
abuses from occurring rather than relying solely on judicial correctives.86 In particular, the 
JCHR, although it was not specifically mandated by the HRA, was conceived politically as 
the way to strengthen parliamentary rights-based scrutiny of proposed legislation.87  
 
As is well known, the structure of the HRA differs from that of constitutional bills of 
rights in other countries in that it provides a statutory protection for human rights while being 
designed ultimately to preserve the authority of parliament.88 The Act has no entrenched 
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status and can be revised or repealed on the basis of a parliamentary majority. It permits the 
courts to read primary and subordinate legislation in a way that is compatible with 
Convention rights, but only ‘so far as it is possible to do so’.89 If such an interpretation is 
impossible, the courts are provided with a non-coercive mechanism – a declaration of 
incompatibility – which signals to the executive and legislature the inconsistency between 
domestic statute and Convention rights.90 Crucially, it is left to the elected branches of 
government to decide whether they agree that there is an incompatibility and, if so, whether 
and how to remedy it.91 Parliament’s role in the scheme of the HRA is further enshrined in a 
provision requiring ministers introducing draft legislation to attach a statement as its 
compatibility with the Convention, thereby disciplining ministers to conduct scrutiny of a 
bill’s compatibility at the same time as providing a legal foundation for parliamentary rights-
based scrutiny.92 
 
Masterman and Leigh observe that academic accounts of the HRA’s short existence are 
paradoxical,93 variously portraying the Act as either democratic or counter-majoritarian;94 an 
effective remedial instrument or one that provides insufficient protection;95 an established 
part of the UK’s uncodified constitution or an ordinary statute subject to the vagaries of 
political opinion.96 These accounts correspond broadly to the legal versus political 
constitutionalist divide in scholarship, which (as noted in section 1.1 (iv)) persists despite the 
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emergence of an alternative - and, in my view, preferable - conception of democratic 
constitutionalism based on shared responsibility for human rights. This debate has often been 
conducted in normative terms, with reference to idealised models rather than observed 
institutional behaviour. Conversely, Philippson advocates an approach which grounds 
analysis in political reality, recognising that the latter frequently fails to conform to the 
former.97   
 
This observation is a salient reminder of the increasingly politicised nature of discourse 
about human rights in the UK. As I discuss in The UK and the European Court of Human 
Rights and Developing a Bill of Rights, the existing state of human rights law has been 
subject to existential criticism by some politicians, jurists and commentators, who have called 
for a fundamental revision of the UK’s relationship with the Strasbourg Court and the 
replacement of the HRA with a new bill of rights.98 My analysis of these challenges to the 
utility and legitimacy of both the HRA and the Strasbourg Court is presented in part 4.   
 
3. HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC SERVICES 
 
In this part of my statement, I provide a synoptic account of my research relating to the 
implementation and impact of the HRA in public services in the UK. I identify cross-cutting 
themes and relate each to the existing literature and the conceptual frameworks introduced 
above.   
 
I have argued (section 1.1 (iii)) that a holistic assessment of the impact of the HRA 
requires analysis of the changes to the behaviour of all types of institution that act, or attempt 
to act, to the public good under its prompting. I noted also (part 2) that a situation in which a 
public authority becomes habitually responsive to human rights has commonly been termed a 
‘human rights culture’. Another, closely-related term is also used in relation to the 
programmatic application of human rights: the ‘human rights-based approach’.   
 
The first strand of my research thus addresses the following questions. First, how might 
we define a ‘culture of human rights’ or ‘human rights-based approach’ (section 3.1)?  
Secondly, how is such a culture or approach realised in institutional and policy terms (section 
3.2)? Thirdly, what attitudinal and institutional factors have tended to encourage or inhibit 
such a culture or approach, with particular reference to the implementation of human rights 
judgments (section 3.3)? Fourthly, what evidence may be adduced as to the impact of human 
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rights-based interventions (section 3.4)? Fifthly, how far has the HRA connected to public 
policy concerned with poverty and social exclusion (section 3.5)? Sixthly, what are the key 
differences and similarities between the nations of the UK with respect to the implementation 
of human rights norms (section 3.6)? In conclusion, to what extent - and with what variation - 
has a human rights culture materialised among public authorities in the UK following the 
enactment of the HRA (section 3.7)?  
 
3.1 What is a human rights culture or a human rights-based approach? 
My research approaches the matter of definition from both an empirical and normative 
perspective (Critical Review, Chapter 2; Evaluating the Impact of Selected Cases under the 
HRA, Chapter 8; ‘Evaluating the Impact of Human Rights Litigation’ and Poverty, Inequality 
and Human Rights, Chapter 1). I use existing definitions and their normative content in order 
to analyse the experience of public authorities that have applied human rights systematically 
in their work. The results of this inquiry have, in turn, contributed to the emergent 
understanding of what constitutes a human rights culture or human rights-based approach in 
both empirical and normative terms.   
 
As noted in part 2, the term ‘human rights culture’ was invoked by government 
ministers and others frequently in the early years of the Act but proved, as Clements observes, 
to be ‘admirably imprecise’.99 The term has retained its currency but is often loosely defined 
or not defined at all.100 An unusually dense definition is offered by the JCHR and is worth 
citing at length. The JCHR views what it calls a ‘culture of respect for human rights’ as 
encompassing two dimensions – institutional and ethical: 
 
... the former requires that human rights should shape the goals, structures and 
practices of our public authorities ... Achieving that requires public authorities to 
understand their obligations both to avoid violating the rights of those in their care, or 
whom they serve, and to have regard to their wider and more positive duty to ‘secure 
to everyone ... the rights and freedoms’ which the Human Rights Act ... and the other 
[international human rights] instruments define.101 
 
The ethical dimension has three components:   
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First, a sense of entitlement. Citizens enjoy certain rights as an affirmation of their 
equal dignity and worth, and not as a contingent gift of the state. Second, a sense of 
personal responsibility. The rights of one person can easily impinge on the rights of 
another and each must therefore exercise his or her rights with care. Third, a sense of 
social obligation. The rights of one person can require positive obligations on the part 
of another and, in addition, a fair balance will frequently have to be struck between 
individual rights and the needs of a democratic society and the wider public 
interest.102 
 
The term ‘human rights-based approach’ has been more thoroughly debated and 
theorised. As discussed in Poverty, Inequality and Human Rights (Chapter 1), the term 
originated in the international development sector and has become increasingly central to 
anti-poverty strategies developed by the United Nations, governments and non-government 
organisations.103 In the development context, the human rights-based approach emphasises 
the need to identify and redress power imbalances and prioritise the interests of those who 
face unusual levels of discrimination or social exclusion. Consequently, it insists on certain 
procedural requirements (participation, empowerment, non-discrimination, accountability and 
transparency) and the structures required to fulfil them. Central to the human rights-based 
approach as commonly defined is the idea that very individual is a ‘rights-holder’, having 
inherent dignity and equal worth, and that there also ‘duty-bearers’ with correlative 
obligations both of delivery and oversight (primarily states and their agencies). Applying 
human rights entails a normative shift from discretionary meeting of needs to socially and 
legally guaranteed entitlements: human rights-based interventions aim to strengthen the 
capacities of rights-holders to claim their entitlements and of duty-bearers to meet their 
obligations.104 Further, the human rights-based approach commonly conceptualises human 
rights as both a means and an end, being concerned both with process (adopting methods 
which expressly conform to human rights standards and principles) and outcomes (the 
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substantive realisation of human rights) and viewing the two as interdependent.105 Thus, such 
an approach is integrally concerned with the programmatic aspect of applying human rights 
standards and principles to policy, planning and practice (Poverty, Inequality and Human 
Rights, Chapter 5). 
 
There is a degree of congruence between such a human rights-based approach and the 
human rights culture envisaged by the JCHR. Indeed, in the UK the terms are often used 
interchangeably. Each is underpinned by an understanding of human rights as universal and 
inalienable, and as deriving from the full range of domestic and international human rights 
instruments. Each involves both recognition of rights (institutional thinking) and respect for 
rights (systematic application). Some difference in emphasis is apparent: the JCHR’s ethical 
dimension stresses the importance of personal responsibility and horizontal social 
obligations; the human rights-based approach (with its emphasis on the relationship between 
the state and the individual) does not. However, a human rights-based approach is compatible 
with the notions of personal responsibility and social obligation, as long as those notions are 
not used as a pretext for attenuating human rights protection or making rights contingent 
upon certain types of behaviour.106  Indeed (as I discuss in the UK context in the Critical 
Review, pp. 7-8), the duty to respect the rights of others is implicit in the exercise of rights 
under the HRA.  
 
In the UK, the term human rights-based approach has been readily adopted by public 
authorities,107 national human rights institutions,108 and civil society organisations.109 My 
research focuses principally on public authorities as the primary duty-bearers (Critical 
Review; Evaluating the Impact of Selected Cases under the HRA; ‘Evaluating the Impact of 
Human Rights Litigation’; Poverty, Inequality and Human Rights, Chapter 5). I suggest 
(Evaluating the Impact of Selected Cases under the HRA, Chapter 8) that this activity may be 
conceptualised as the ‘supply’ side of human rights. Secondarily, I examine the adoption of a 
human rights-based approach by non-government actors for whom the normative content of 
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human rights is a means of framing advocacy and pursuing accountability for state action or 
inaction that implicates human rights (Poverty, Inequality and Human Rights, Chapters 3 and 
4; ‘Limits and Achievements of the HRA’). Such advocacy, which promotes and facilitates 
the initiation of rights claims, may be viewed as the ‘demand’ side of human rights.    
 
3.2  Embedding human rights: the institutional dimension      
My research indicates that adopting an organisational approach to human rights is a creative - 
and still experimental - rather than prescriptive process (Critical Review, Chapter 2). 
However, the experience of public authorities in the UK which have developed such 
approaches has allowed me to identify common and mutually reinforcing features which 
encompass both the institutional and ethical dimensions proposed by the JCHR (Critical 
Review; Evaluating the Impact of Selected Cases under the HRA; ‘Evaluating the Impact of 
Human Rights Litigation’).  
 
These features are: (i) an express recognition of the positive obligations that are 
required of public authorities as a result of the application of human rights standards; (ii) the 
systematic involvement of people who use public services in their design and delivery, and in 
decisions that affect them; and (iii) the integration of human rights standards, and the 
associated concepts of necessity and proportionality, into routine decision-making.  
 
(i) Positive obligations 
The interpretative principle of positive obligations is well-established in human rights case 
law.110 Public authorities have not merely a negative obligation to refrain from interfering 
with individuals’ human rights but also a positive obligation to take proactive steps to ensure 
that individuals’ rights are protected, regardless of who or what is causing the harm. These 
obligations are not expressly stated in the HRA or indeed in the ECHR. Rather, they are 
imposed through the common law as a result of court judgments interpreting the requirement 
of Article 1 of the Convention (which obliges a state to secure human rights for everyone 
under its jurisdiction) taken together with the other substantive Convention rights. 
 
The contribution of my research is to highlight the way in which positive obligations 
have been used instrumentally as the foundation for an organisational approach to human 
rights, an imperative which is evident in the institutional dimension of the JCHR’s definition 
of a human rights culture cited in section 3.1. The Critical Review report (Chapter 2) 
identifies examples of public authorities which have promoted understanding among staff of 
their positive obligations (if not always expressly labelled as such) in order to challenge 
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entrenched practices or attitudes which are inimical to the realisation of human rights; for 
example, by developing procedures to protect the right to life under Article 2 ECHR in 
prisons in relation to suicide prevention and the provision of healthcare. Another compelling 
example is the way in which police services in England and Wales have responded to the case 
of Osman,111 which established the circumstances in which the authorities should reasonably 
be expected to take preventative measures to avert a risk to life. Evaluating the Impact of 
Selected Cases under the HRA (Chapter 2) finds that police services have embedded the 
Osman principles into policing policy and practice in respect of a far wider range of 
situations than those examined by the court.   
 
Evaluating the Impact of Selected Cases under the HRA analyses other examples from 
case law and their variable impact on the behaviour of public authorities. These concern the 
positive action that public authorities must take to secure the dignity and integrity of people 
with disabilities (Chapters 4, 6 and 7);112 and (building on Osman) the holding of effective 
investigations where there has been preventable loss of life (Chapter 3).113 The JCHR has 
additionally highlighted the positive dimension of rights in the context of areas such as 
equality, education and schools, human trafficking, housing and property rights, corporate 
manslaughter and homicide, and the protection of children in the immigration system.114  
 
Other initiatives offer a model for embedding positive obligations in the structures and 
processes of public authorities. For instance, Wiltshire Council has developed an innovative 
outcomes-based approach to the provision of social care for older people.115 This involves 
social workers supporting older people to determine what they want the outcomes of their 
care to be - outcomes which private and voluntary providers are then contractually required to 
deliver. Although Wiltshire’s approach is not expressly rights-focused, the EHRC has 
identified the potential to promote the outcomes-based approach into one which incorporates 
human rights standards and principles into the commissioning and delivery of social care in 
the home, thereby putting in place structures and processes to help ensure that local 
authorities fulfil their positive obligations in this area.116  
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Advocates of an organisational approach which expressly embraces positive obligations 
view it as a means of reconceptualising human rights and their implications for service 
delivery: rights are no longer viewed minimally as ‘red lines’ which must not be crossed, but 
are likened instead to a magnet pulling policy and practice in a positive direction (Critical 
Review, p. 38). I conclude in the Critical Review (p. 41) that an organisational approach 
which expressly recognises and acts upon positive obligations provides the basis for moving 
beyond a minimal and defensive approach to human rights compliance and towards a more 
expansive and potentially transformative approach. However, my research suggests that 
public authorities generally do not have such a comprehensive understanding of what positive 
obligations entail and in what circumstances they may come into play (Critical Review, p. 
40), a finding confirmed - and deplored - by the JCHR.117  
 
(ii) Participation of service users   
I noted in section 3.1 that human rights provide a normative framework within which to 
challenge unequal power relationships and recast relationships between groups with 
differential power. In the context of a public service, this means identifying and redressing 
power imbalances, principally (although not exclusively) between the users and providers of 
services. Proceeding from this premise, I argue that guaranteed opportunities for the 
participation of service users and carers in decisions that affect them - which extend beyond 
the tokenistic - form part of a normative blueprint for an organisational approach to human 
rights (Critical Review, Chapter 3). This imperative is especially acute where individuals face 
high levels of social exclusion or discrimination or experience circumstances or treatment in 
which their human rights may be particularly vulnerable to abuse, such as people who need to 
access services because they have physical or learning disabilities or mental health problems. 
In such settings, the cumulative effect of guaranteeing participation of service users was 
likened by one practitioner whom I interviewed to ‘restoring citizenship to those who have 
had their citizenship taken away’ (Critical Review, p. 59). 
 
My research documents examples of public authorities which habitually involve service 
users and carers in diverse ways as part of an avowedly human rights-based approach.118 
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These include aspects of individual care and treatment, such as the assessment and 
management of risk to a person or to others. They also include activities which relate to the 
planning and delivery of services, such as: the recruitment, induction and training and 
performance review of staff, including senior staff; reviews of serious incidents such as 
suicides; inspection and evaluation of specific services; procurement and finance; and the 
development of information and communication strategies to enable people using services to 
make informed decisions. In order to ensure that such participation progresses beyond the 
superficial, public authorities have in some cases elected to invest resources in training 
service users about human rights and building their capacity in other respects; and 
remunerating service users for their contribution.  
 
Evaluations of human rights-based initiatives which place emphasis on the participation 
of service users indicate a range of beneficial outcomes for service users, staff and the service 
as whole.119 These include attitudinal changes, such as the erosion of stigma and mistrust 
between service users and professionals and consequent improvements to relationships.120 
They also include measured improvements in outcomes (e.g. clinical or educational);121 
reported levels of self-esteem and well-being among people using a service; and levels of 
sickness and stress among staff (Critical Review, pp. 53-62). It should be noted, however, 
that such evaluations are few and are limited to a handful of public authorities, albeit ones 
which have several years’ experience in applying human rights at an organisational level. 
 
The systematic participation of people using services in decisions that affect them is not 
a goal unique to avowedly human rights-based interventions. Other initiatives, such as that of 
‘co-production’ which is taking root in public services in Wales122 and Scotland123 have 
similarly placed emphasis on public participation in the commissioning, procurement, design, 
delivery and evaluation of public services in Wales. Co-production is defined as ‘delivering 
public services in an equal and reciprocal relationship between professionals, people using 
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services, their families and their neighbours’ such that both services and neighbourhoods 
become more effective agents of change.124 Co-production has found concrete expression in, 
for example, the participation of people with gender dysphoria in initiatives to redesign 
services for their communities in Wales125 and Scotland.126 Such approaches are congruent 
with a human rights-based approach without always being framed as human rights-driven. In 
this context, I suggest that a key contribution of the human rights-based approach is to 
provide a set of transparent criteria by which to assess such initiatives in terms of how far 
they achieve the aim of power-sharing and the organisational and attitudinal change required 
to achieve it.   
 
Civil society organisations have demonstrated the utility of human rights as a vehicle to 
secure opportunities to participate in decision-making about resource allocation and service 
delivery. A compelling example is that of the Participation and Practice of Rights project in 
Belfast, which has pioneered the development – by communities affected by endemic poverty 
– of indicators and time-bound targets to measure the realisation of their human rights 
(Poverty, Inequality and Human Rights, pp. 24-25). Tangible improvements have resulted. In 
one initiative, families affected by disproportionately high rates of suicide and self-harm 
secured policy change across Northern Ireland on guaranteed follow-up appointments for 
mental health service users.127 In another, residents in a housing estate devised indicators to 
measure whether a regeneration project fulfilled the state’s obligation to progressively realise 
their rights under international human rights law to work, education, adequate housing and 
the highest attainable standard of health. Residents secured improvements relating to the 
prompt clearing of pigeon waste, rehousing families out of unsuitable accommodation and 
preventing sewage flowing into bathrooms.128 However, progress on indicators relating to 
residents’ systematic involvement in decision-making was minimal, suggesting that, even 
                                                          
124
 D. Boyle, A. Coote, C. Sherwood and J. Slay (2010) Right Here, Right Now: Taking Co-Production into the 
Mainstream (London: NESTA). 
125
 Up to one–third of the members of the All-Wales Gender Dysphoria Partnership Board are service users. See 
Welsh Health Specialised Services Committee (undated), All-Wales Gender Dysphoria Partnership Board: 
Terms of Reference .  
126
 In 2012, the Scottish Government introduced a new Gender Reassignment Protocol which was devised with 
the participation of the transgender community and, uniquely in the UK, guarantees the option of self-referral to 
a gender identity clinic without the need to be referred by a GP. See NHS Scotland (2012) Gender Reassignment 
Protocol.     
127
 F. V. McMillan, N. Browne, S. Green and D. Donnelly (2009) ‘A Card before You Leave: Participation and 
Mental Health in Northern Ireland’, Health and Human Rights 11(1): 61. See also 
http://www.pprproject.org/right-to-health. 
128
 Participation and the Practice of Rights (2009) Seven Towers Monitoring Group: Fourth Report on Progress 
of Human Rights Indicators (Belfast: PPR).  
31 
 
with sustained rights-based mobilisation in pursuit of participation, it may very hard to 
achieve in the absence of an explicit commitment on the part of public authorities.   
 
(iii) Human rights as a framework for decision-making 
I argued in section 1.1 (ii) and (iii) that the culture of justification pertains to all public 
authorities that are bound to act compatibly with Convention rights. This implies that from a 
normative perspective public authorities must be able to justify interfering with, or failing to 
protect, human rights by reference to publicly available reasons which must be open to 
independent scrutiny. Such an approach may raise concerns about introducing excessive 
legalism into operational decision-making. Such concerns are not new but can be traced back 
to Titmuss’s thesis on the ‘pathology of legalism’129 and similar critiques which focus on the 
risk of introducing undue rigidity into decision-making and constraining bureaucratic 
discretion.130 Indeed, this is a critique that I have encountered among decision-makers in 
public authorities who are fearful that the effect of the HRA may be to restrict the ability of 
professionals to exercise their judgment or burden them unduly with concerns about possible 
litigation (see, e.g., Evaluating the Impact of Selected Cases under the HRA, p. 110).  
 
Such concerns can only be heightened by accounts in the media and political debate of 
instances in which the HRA has purportedly been misinterpreted or misapplied, a persistent 
theme being the alleged propensity of decision-makers to allow ill-founded considerations 
about individuals’ human rights to trump wider public interests.131 However, no evidence has 
been adduced to support the argument that such instances are either endemic or insuperable. 
Some notorious instances have been reiterated by politicians even after they have been 
authoritatively refuted, suggesting a degree of contempt for the requirement of open 
justification proposed in section 1.1 (ii).132 Moreover, the JCHR notes that the HRA has been 
used in several high-profile cases as a scapegoat for unrelated administrative failings.133 
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I suggest that legitimate concern about misapplication does not invalidate attempts to 
embed human rights in the process of decision-making; rather, it raises questions about how 
this process is undertaken. My research analyses the application of the human rights 
framework as a means of structuring bureaucratic discretion, drawing on the experience of 
public authorities that have developed and applied such an approach over a period of years 
(Critical Review; Evaluating the Impact of Human Rights-Based Interventions). There are 
striking commonalities between these experiences, despite the fact that they were pursued 
largely independently of each other,134 in different types of public service, and with variable 
‘triggers’, such as negative inspectorate reports;135 fatal or violent incidents,136 or specific 
legislative requirements.137  
 
a. Structures and processes  
The most visible area of commonality is the institutional; that is, the structures and processes 
that were used to develop and sustain the human rights-based approach. The following list 
distils the experience of overtly rights-respecting public authorities and reflects the lessons 
gained from evaluations of that experience (Critical Review, Chapter 2; Evaluating the 
Impact of Human Rights-Based Interventions). As such, it provides a model for securing 
institutional commitment to positive human rights compliance, though one which leaves 
much room for creative adaptation. These steps include:     
 
• Systematic review, assessment and readjustment of policies and procedures (and, less 
commonly, monitoring of outcomes) for human rights compliance, e.g. using a ‘traffic 
light’ warning system;  
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• Committed leadership which articulates how human rights reinforce other 
organisational priorities and values;  
• The identification of human rights ‘champions’ at different levels of seniority in order 
to create a continuous cycle of reinforcement throughout an organisation;  
• Structures to support the participation of people using services in design and delivery 
of services and in decisions that affect them (see above section 3.2 (ii));   
• Steps to gauge staff members’ and/or or service users’ knowledge and understanding 
of human rights;   
• Training and guidance for staff which relate human rights standards and principles 
clearly to operational roles;   
• Arrangements to monitor human rights case law and disseminate to operational staff 
in accessible language the implications for policy and practice, including in  respect of 
positive obligations; 
• The production of specific tools (e.g. manuals, checklists) to support staff to make 
human rights compliant decisions with confidence;  
• The use of human rights as a foundation for the integration of other duties and 
functions, e.g. those focused on equality and diversity, care planning, commissioning; 
procurement; freedom of information or mental capacity; and  
• Steps to broadcast an organisation’s commitment to human rights to staff and service 
users, e.g. using human rights language in communications; or producing practice 
guides, codes of ethics or a human rights ‘charter’.  
 
Several public authorities have made intermittent use of external human rights experts, 
e.g. to train staff or help identify areas in which policy and practice may be at risk of non-
compliance.    
 
b. Human rights-based policy change  
There is also commonality as to the types of policy change that have flowed from these 
structural and procedural innovations, albeit very unevenly between public authorities, as 
discussed throughout Evaluating the Impact of Selected Cases under the HRA. In some 
instances, policies or practices which are indiscriminate in nature have been replaced by ones 
which are personalised and sensitive to context. For example, some public authorities have: 
replaced blanket bans on the manual handling of individuals in health or social care settings 
with individualised risk assessments (Evaluating the Impact of Selected Cases under the HRA, 
Chapter 6);138 stopped the indiscriminate use of policies and practices such as mail vetting, 
body searches and restrictions on movement;139 or revised blanket policies on intentional 
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homelessness because they disadvantage vulnerable children (Evaluating the Impact of 
Selected Cases under the HRA, p. 111). Policies or practices which are punitive in their 
purpose or application (e.g. the use of seclusion as a form of punishment) have similarly been 
discontinued after human rights-based review.140  
 
Evaluations reveal express use of (as one professional termed it) the ‘mantra’ of 
legality, necessity and proportionality.141 In particular, practitioners working with individuals 
whose circumstances render them vulnerable, or who may pose a risk to themselves or others, 
have embraced human rights as a means of assessing and managing risk, recognising that 
both failure to take account of risk and excessive risk aversion can lead to infringements of 
human rights (Critical Review, pp. 77-80). Health practitioners have used human rights 
standards and principles to develop a ‘positive risk management’ approach with patients with 
complex needs who may pose a risk to themselves or others (Evaluating the Impact of 
Human Rights-Based Interventions, pp. 46-56).142 This uses the principles of necessity and 
proportionality in order to make decisions which transparently balance the rights involved in 
an individual’s risky behaviour against the rights (or restriction of rights) involved in the 
strategy being proposed to manage that risk. The intention is to ensure that intervention 
follows the least restrictive route available and that the infringement of a person’s human 
rights is thereby kept to a minimum. This approach also involves acting preventatively by 
analysing the individual’s life history and the context in which risky behaviour occurs, as 
well as providing structured opportunities for the individual to participate in decision-making, 
in contrast to approaches which view risk assessment and management as the sole preserve of 
the professional. Further, the positive risk management approach uses human rights as a 
unifying framework to integrate equality considerations into the assessment and management 
of risk.  
 
The relationship between risk and human rights is a dominant theme of human rights-
based guidance for public authorities produced by national human rights institutions, 
inspectorates, government departments and non-government actors.143 Some public 
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authorities have adopted human rights as part of a corporate risk-management approach, in 
the sense that reviewing policies and practices for human rights compliance is perceived to 
reduce the risk of having to react to critical media comment, censure by inspectorates or 
litigation.144 However, the interaction of risk-based public policy and human rights is not yet 
fully understood. Murphy and Witty argue, for example, that prison governance in the UK 
has become ‘enveloped by discourses of risk and of rights’, yet there is scant interchange 
between criminologists and human rights lawyers as to how the two discourses interact.145 
For some authors, human rights law and principles play a normative as well as a practical role 
in risk assessment and management. Writing of the move from ‘risk management’ to ‘risk 
control’ in the probation service, and the concomitant risk of rights infringement, Hudson 
encourages ‘a whole-hearted embrace of the ideas of human rights: not just ... the Human 
Rights Act, but also embrace of a rights culture’.146 Zedner argues that, to the extent that risk-
based measures may infringe rights, it is all the more important that they be bound by legal 
strictures enshrining basic values such as equality, fairness, and the preservation of human 
rights.147 In summary, there is scope for further research and development of professional 
practice in respect of the relationship between risk and human rights in different public 
services and among different spheres of expertise. 
 
My research further indicates the potential utility of human rights as a framework of 
values within which to balance competing interests in the context of a public service or 
workplace. For example, claims under equality and human rights law concerning religion or 
belief have been a particularly vexed area for decision-makers, especially where they appear 
to be in tension with claims based on other characteristics such as sexual orientation or 
gender. My Religion or Belief report examines from both an empirical and normative 
perspective situations in which an individual’s right to manifest their religion or belief 
appears to clash with operational imperatives or the equally-held rights of others e.g. 
dilemmas relating to the wearing of clothes or symbols or requests to be exempt from certain 
tasks. I argue that such dilemmas have been (or could have been) resolved using human rights 
principles (Religion or Belief, Chapters 8 and 9). As established in case law (and explained in 
Religion or Belief, pp. 73-77), these include not only the considerations of legality, necessity 
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and proportionality but also the requirement for any restrictions to the freedom of religion or 
belief to be non-discriminatory and for public authorities to act in a neutral fashion as 
between religions and as between religious and non-religious forms of belief. These 
principles provide decision-makers outside the courtroom with a substantive set of positive 
principles with which to shape their policy and practice. Moreover, I argue that, from the 
perspective of those implementing the law, an approach based on human rights is likely to be 
more satisfactory and capable of commanding support than one based solely or principally on 
equality (Religion or Belief, pp. 152-53). This is because the equality framework, when used 
in isolation, risks encouraging an undue insistence on the assertion of competing identities, as 
has been evident in a number of high-profile cases.148 My research on religion or belief is 
discussed in detail in section 4.3.  
  
In summary, there is an emerging body of evidence as to the utility of human rights as a 
framework for decision-making at the level of policy and operational decision-making. 
Experience of applying human rights in a thoroughgoing way within a service or organisation 
is limited to a relatively small number of public authorities. Yet the evidence to date 
addresses the critique that human rights necessarily stifle discretion by imposing a legal 
straightjacket on decision-makers. It suggests, rather, that – properly understood - human 
rights provide a framework within which to manage risk, ensure transparency and find 
balanced and proportionate solutions to complex problems. Moreover, my research indicates 
that practitioners who have developed a human rights-based approach have, in practice, been 
creative and eclectic in the process of implementation. Some public authorities use human 
rights as a unifying conceptual framework within which to integrate other legislative 
obligations or initiatives such as the personalisation of care and treatment; commissioning; 
legal reform in the field of mental capacity; and equality duties (Evaluating the Impact of 
Human Rights-Based Interventions, p. 51).   
 
3.3  The impact of human rights judgments   
Writing in the South African context, Heywood describes human rights judgments as ‘pieces 
of paper with untapped potential’149 – potential, that is, to influence decision-makers or effect 
social change beyond the parties to the particular case. Literature on the impact of judicial 
review on institutional behaviour reaches mixed conclusions, in relation both to the UK and 
other common law jurisdictions (my focus in this section is literature relating to the UK).150 
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One strand of literature may be characterised as ‘impact agnosticism’ – the view that it will 
never be possible to collect sufficient data to analyse comprehensively the impact of judicial 
review on complex bureaucracies.151 Among scholars who defend the enterprise of judicial 
impact studies, the dominant message has been to emphasise the limited ability of judicial 
review to influence administrative decision-making.152 Moreover, where courts are said to 
exert influence, this is sometimes perceived to be negative in various ways.153 For instance, 
authors who have conducted empirical studies of individuated decision-making about 
homelessness in local authorities in the UK argue that there is minimal absorption of public 
law duties identified in judicial review and a strong tendency for authorities to use creative 
means to evade compliance.154 However, studies conducted in other realms of decision-
making such as social security highlight the educative and scrutiny function of judicial 
review and its beneficial impact on administrative justice.155 King further argues that studies 
which are principally concerned with the policy level impact of judicial review may neglect 
the significance of individual redress, both in relation to the decisions of courts and tribunals 
and the far greater number of claims which are resolved short of judicial consideration.156 
These divergent conclusions suggest that the identification of the impact of judicial review is 
likely to vary according to the sectors which are being examined and the methodology 
employed. 
 
Platt, Sunkin and Calvo employ both qualitative and quantitative methodologies to 
assess the impact of administrative law review on local authority performance in England and 
Wales.157  They conclude that judicial review is correlated in a statistically significant way to 
modest improvements in the quality of public services (according to officially-defined 
performance indicators).158 In addition, qualitative responses from local authority officials 
gave many indications that judicial review is considered to have improved the quality of 
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decision making.159 They conclude that judgments ‘give expression to the needs of 
individualised administrative justice; to the requirement that public authorities are able to 
justify their actions in law and that they act fairly and in a manner that is compatible with 
human rights’.160   
  
My research contributes to this literature by identifying both attitudinal and institutional 
factors which tend to encourage or inhibit the smooth transition from a legal judgment to 
changes in policy and practice that would have a wider impact on the realisation of particular 
human rights (Evaluating the Impact of Selected Cases under the HRA; ‘Evaluating the 
Impact of Human Rights Litigation’; ‘Limits and Achievements of the HRA’). Assessing the 
impact of judgments requires us to cast the net wide for evidence: impact may be visible in 
changes to law, public policy and its implementation, including the process by which 
decisions are made. It may also be evident in outcomes in the form of both empirical social 
realities and the experience of people delivering and using the services that are implicated in 
the judgment. In addition, the imprint of judgments may be visible in professional manuals 
and codes of practice and in wider discussion in professional circles and the media of the 
principles at stake.    
 
(i) Levers for achieving impact    
There are different mechanisms by which human rights judgments influence institutional 
behaviour, as examined in Evaluating the Impact of Selected Cases under the HRA, 
‘Evaluating the Impact of Human Rights Litigation’ and The UK and the European Court of 
Human Rights (Chapter 5). Impact beyond that on the parties to a case can most easily be 
identified where a legal judgment has immediate implications for legislation, administrative 
action or statutory guidance, i.e. where a judgment leads directly to a change in the law or the 
way that the law is applied.  
 
In some instances, judgments are revolutionary in their effect, impelling public 
authorities to drive visible and sometimes rapid change from the top down. A compelling 
example is Napier, which ended the inhuman or degrading practice of ‘slopping out’ in 
Scottish prisons (Critical Review, pp. 149-50).161  
 
Another is Limbuela, concerning the application of Section 55 of the Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 which allowed support to be refused to individuals who 
failed to apply for asylum ‘as soon as reasonably practicable’, causing many to become 
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destitute (Evaluating the Impact of Selected Cases under the HRA, Chapter 5). The case 
established the principle that, where the fate of individuals is in the hands of the state 
(because it denies them support and bars them from either working or claiming mainstream 
benefits), consequent severe destitution constitutes inhuman or degrading treatment under 
Article 3 ECHR.162 Although Limbuela related to a specific regime of hardship imposed on 
the claimants, the case may be viewed as articulating the far-reaching proposition that ‘the 
state can be held responsible to meet the basic needs of everyone in the jurisdiction, wherever 
existing legal structures have been directly implicated in their denial’.163 My research showed 
that Limbuela had a direct impact on the use of Section 55: after the House of Lords 
judgment in 2005, some 9,000 fewer applicants were deemed ineligible for support compared 
to 2003 (Evaluating the Impact of Selected Cases under the HRA, p. 68).164 Guidance to 
asylum case workers and policy teams was revised and expressly adopted the destitution 
threshold set out in Limbuela. Unlike pre-Limbuela guidance, it indicated how to apply the 
Article 3 test in practice. However, I argue that the judgment had a narrower impact that 
might have been expected. Despite the generalisable implications of the judgment, it was 
interpreted extremely narrowly by the UK Government to apply only to the specific matrix of 
factors arising in the case. Thus, the case had no impact on government policy, e.g. in 
addressing the rising incidence of destitution among failed asylum seekers, including those 
who are unable to leave the UK through no fault of their own yet who are denied support 
under section 4 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999.165 However, I found that Limbuela 
had impacted – albeit with considerable variation - on how local authorities assess and 
support destitute people with no recourse to public funds (Evaluating the Impact of Selected 
Cases under the HRA pp. 74-77).    
 
The ECtHR judgment in the ‘Bournewood’ case,166 concerning the lack of safeguards 
for individuals who lack the mental capacity to consent or disagree to their care or treatment, 
presents an even more complex picture. The case had a direct impact in that it triggered a 
restructuring of mental capacity law and regulation in England and Wales through the 
introduction of Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS).167 However, there is evidence that 
DoLS are neither widely understood nor consistently implemented by public authorities, 
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suggesting that it will be a considerable time before the full impact of the case in protecting 
the rights of individuals who lack the capacity to make informed decisions about their care or 
treatment can be determined.168 Clements adds that thousands of individuals, such as elderly 
people with dementia, may never benefit from the judgment unless, like the claimant in the 
Bournewood case, they have conscientious and persistent advocates.169  
 
In other instances, impact has been substantial but cumulative over a period of years; 
e.g. the elaboration in successive ECtHR and domestic judgments of detailed procedural 
obligations for the investigation of deaths at the hands of the state or when people are in the 
care of the state (The UK and the European Court of Human Rights, pp. 46-51).170 
Elsewhere, legislative responses to judgments may be delayed due to political resistance or 
the persistence of controversy about the implications of the judgment. Note, for example, the 
time-lag between judgments and outcomes in cases concerning corporal punishment (The UK 
and the European Court of Human Rights, pp. 63-64).171 Delay may also be attributed simply 
to inertia, e.g. the time lag of nine years in legislating to ensure the right of people who have 
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170
 See, especially, cases at the ECtHR concerning the death of the applicants’ next-of-kin during security forces 
operations (or in circumstances giving rise to suspicions of  collusion of such forces) in Northern Ireland: 
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been in public care to access records relating to their time in care (The UK and the European 
Court of Human Rights, p. 74).172  
 
  The process by which impact is achieved may result from the combination of multiple 
social and political factors. For example, a judgment which highlights a particular law or 
policy as being inconsistent with human rights norms may be used by civil society actors to 
reframe an issue or make it more prominent, thereby tipping the balance in favour of legal or 
policy reform. ECtHR judgments concerning the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual or 
transgender people contributed to legal reform in respect of the decriminalisation of adult 
homosexual acts in private;173 equalisation of the age of consent;174 removing the prohibition 
on gay men and lesbians joining the armed forces;175 and recognition of the rights of 
transsexuals176 (The UK and the European Court of Human Rights, pp. 71-74).  
 
Practitioners also report using judgments instrumentally to vindicate existing 
‘grassroots’ efforts to challenge their authority’s existing ethos or specific policies or 
practices (e.g. those which are indiscriminate and insensitive to individual circumstances) 
(Evaluating the Impact of Selected Cases under the HRA, pp. 112-13) – a process described 
by Halliday as ‘subversive decision making’.177   
 
(ii) Barriers to achieving impact   
Here, I examine the attitudinal and institutional barriers which may prevent human rights 
judgments with generalisable implications from having the impact that might be expected.  
 
a. Perceptions of human rights 
Surveys of public sector staff reveal knowledge and understanding of human rights and the 
HRA to be generally low, especially ‘explicit’ rather than ‘implicit’ knowledge.178 Similar 
results are evident in surveys of the public.179 Yet my research indicates that lack of 
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 Sutherland v UK, No. 25186/94, 27 March 2001. 
175
 Smith and Grady v UK, Nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, 27 September 1999. 
176
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knowledge and understanding may present less insuperable an obstacle than the variable 
perceptions of human rights, and of the HRA in particular, which condition both individual 
and corporate receptiveness to the implications of judgments. The Critical Review report and 
the report on Evaluating the Impact of Selected Cases under the HRA identify a range of 
negative responses. These include a fear among staff that human rights will be used by 
service users as the basis for unrealistic or unfounded claims;180 and feelings of guilt, anxiety 
or demoralisation at the notion that human rights might be vulnerable to abuse within a 
service. Practitioners speak of the ‘emotional labour’ expended when considering the 
implications of their actions in human rights terms.181 Decision-makers may resent human 
rights law as, in their view, burdensome, peripheral to everyday pressures, or actively 
threatening. My research also identifies a tendency among decision-makers in public 
authorities to view human rights cases as arising from extreme or aberrant circumstances 
(typically expressed as, ‘it could not happen here’), or from the persistence of litigious 
individuals, rather than from any systemic shortcomings (Evaluating the Impact of Selected 
Cases under the HRA, p. 111). This evidence suggests that if efforts to embed human rights 
in routine decision-making are to prosper, they need to address emotional and psychological 
responses as well as cognitive change. 182  
 
  Yet negative responses are neither universal nor insurmountable. Generalisations 
about perceptions of human rights, and therefore willingness to use them as a guide to 
behaviour, are hard to sustain: opinions within a single public authority can differ markedly; 
e.g. officers of the same rank within the same police force described the consequences of the 
Osman case as, on the one hand, a ‘bureaucratic nightmare’ and, on the other, evidence of 
increased professionalism and accountability (Evaluating the Impact of Selected Cases under 
the HRA, pp. 15-16). My research indicates that an organisational human rights approach can 
reconnect staff with their original motivation for taking up their profession, especially in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Ministry of Justice, Human Rights Insight Project, as above n 74, pp. 26-27; K. Kaur-Ballagan, S. Castell, K. 
Brough, and H. Friemert (2009) Public Perceptions of Human Rights (Manchester: Equality and Human Rights 
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services where the ethos has been perceived as being under attack from, among other factors, 
contracting out or target-driven approaches (Critical Review, Chapter 3). Similarly, Platt, 
Sunkin and Calvo observe that judicial review may be received positively as reinforcing the 
public service ethos, which embodies (among other values) fidelity to the law and 
impartiality in reconciling competing claims for resources.183 Individual decision-makers may 
welcome the clarity that judicial decisions offer in reconciling the ever present tension 
between the claims of universalism and particularism; e.g. to prompt the reallocation of 
resources to neglected areas that have suffered from budget-setting driven by more populist 
concerns.184   
 
b. Development and dissemination of generalisable principles   
Another factor that affects how case law translates into institutional and behavioural change 
is the nature of the judgment itself. Judgments which articulate a discrete principle with broad 
potential application185 or which spell out the extent of the obligation on public authorities to 
take positive steps to secure human rights186 are more likely to influence decision-makers 
than those which are ambiguous, opaque or which do not extend beyond a specific 
interpretation of the law applied to a particular set of circumstances.  
 
Further, judgments can only influence behaviour if public authorities monitor human 
rights case law and disseminate the implications for policy and practice to those that need to 
know about and act upon them. The report Evaluating the Impact of Selected Cases under the 
HRA, (pp. 108-10) indicates that mechanisms to review policy and guidance in the light of 
case law, and to disseminate the implications, are often haphazard or dependent on personal 
initiative. In local authorities, differing perceptions exist between legal staff and service 
departments as to the adequacy of those arrangements, in respect of their timeliness and 
accessibility, with service departments tending to have a more negative view of arrangements 
than legal officers.  
 
There is also debate about how far down an organisation it is helpful to signpost 
changes to policy or guidance as being based on human rights. In its response to the research 
project on Evaluating the Impact of Selected Cases under the HRA, the Ministry of Justice 
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ventured that making this linkage explicit to frontline staff may be  unnecessarily legalistic 
and burdensome (p. 110). However, my research has found an appetite among some 
practitioners for changes originating in human rights judgments to be explained as such, since 
it is useful for staff to know that changes are not arbitrary and may involve a balancing of 
rights, including their own. Where an absolute right is engaged, and where legal obligations 
are strong because someone is in the state’s care, interviewees were more likely to articulate a 
need to have their human rights obligations explained expressly.   
 
c. Receptiveness of public authorities to human rights judgments    
In addition, a public authority’s response to judicial review may be significantly determined 
by the degree to which judgments fit with its existing goals, priorities and budgets, as well as 
its engrained corporate culture. Authorities may take the route of minimal or non-compliance 
when there is a need (actual or perceived) for additional resources or for a substantial revision 
of budgeting priorities. In some cases, public authorities appear to develop ways of 
interpreting the obligations they might be expected to take on as a result of case law in such a 
way as to fit within available resources. For instance, in the Behre case,187 which held that a 
local authority (Hillingdon) had mistaken the scope of its duties to former unaccompanied 
asylum seeking children who had been ‘looked after’ by the local authority, the additional 
costs were such that many authorities were unable to fully respond to the judgment and some 
did not do so at all.188  
 
In other instances, case law concerned with a minimum level of decency and respect for 
a claimant’s human rights can struggle to gain purchase in a system which is primarily 
organised around the equitable and transparent rationing of resources and in localities which 
cannot meet the needs of all people in a position similar to that of the claimant. A case is 
point is that of Bernard, concerning a severely disabled woman who had knowingly been left 
in unsuitable accommodation for 20 months, confined to one room and unable to access a 
toilet (Evaluating the Impact of Selected Cases under the HRA, Chapter 7).189 In 
circumstances of pressure on suitably adapted housing stock, my research interviewees did 
not see Bernard as pertinent to the hard decisions that must be made in conditions of scarcity. 
In areas where there was sufficient capacity comfortably to meet the basic level of decent 
treatment set by Bernard, interviewees tended to view the case as an aberration, which had no 
generalisable implications for social housing providers.  
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Reluctance to embrace the implications of judgments may also be due to political 
factors, which may make it expedient for an authority to delay or evade implementing a 
judgment, however clear its implications. As Clements and Morris demonstrate, where 
judgments are seen as benefiting minority interests, especially those of unpopular groups 
such as gypsies and travellers, local authorities appear to find inaction the most attractive 
option, even where compliance may be substantially cheaper in the long term.190 Similarly, 
they explain, local authorities have proved more reluctant proactively to review policies and 
practices for Convention compliance when they concern gypsies and travellers than for more 
general ‘Strasbourg-proofing’ purposes.     
 
Further complexity is added when the implications of human rights obligations appear 
to sit uncomfortably with, or are viewed as subordinate to, other policy imperatives. For 
instance, Clements and Morris analyse the impact that the (more or less simultaneous) 
introduction of the Best Value performance measurement regime191 had on local authorities’ 
implementation of the HRA soon after it came into force.192 Best Value, they argue, had a 
‘materially negative impact’ on HRA implementation by imposing a competing demand on 
officers’ attention, stifling their initiative and fixating them with the objective of meeting 
centrally-generated targets.193 My research reveals a similar tendency among some public 
officials to regard human rights as secondary to, in their view, stronger - and almost 
invariably better understood - drivers, e.g. performance indicators and targets; codes of 
practice; audit, inspection and complaint-handling regimes; and other statutory and regulatory 
regimes (Evaluating the Impact of Selected Cases under the HRA, pp. 104-105). The 
suggestion of one specialist advisor to local authorities (interviewed in 2008) was that the 
HRA is not ‘in the DNA’ of authorities unlike, for example, equality law. 
 
d. The implementation cycle 
As a result of the barriers identified above, judicial declarations of rights may often, as Epp 
observes, find only ‘pale reflections’ in institutional practice.194 My research contributes to 
understanding of the mechanisms by which legal judgments are (or are not) translated into 
changes in law, policy and behaviour. This is critical, I suggest, since knowing how human 
rights judgments achieve impact, or are impeded from doing so, enables human rights 
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proponents to devise strategies and make recommendations that go beyond individual cases 
to the very process of translating law into the realisation of rights. The report Evaluating the 
Impact of Selected Cases under the HRA (Chapter 8) proposes a normative scheme which 
takes account of the complex legal, policy and social environment in which new principles 
need to be applied if they are to affect institutional or individual behaviour. It is premised on 
the view that litigation is part of a long-term process involving promotion and 
implementation and harnessing multiple formal and informal channels. The process is 
presented as a cycle, as shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1:   Human rights implementation cycle 
 
 
 
Within this scheme, national leadership is required to promote the principles of human 
rights case law – both from central government policy departments and national human rights 
institutions, as well as others with national influence such as regulators, inspectorates and 
ombudsmen. This is especially valuable to counteract any tendency among public authorities 
to respond to judgments in a reactive or piecemeal way rather than considering whether 
human rights principles demand a more fundamental shift in thinking. Promotion of human 
rights judgments via professional networks and traditional and social media is proposed as an 
effective way to reach practitioners, given the patchy institutional application of case law. 
The public profile of a judgment may also galvanise authorities concerned about reputational 
risk.   
 
Advocacy – both legal representation and campaigning advocacy – is required to boost 
the ‘demand side’ in relation to human rights judgments. In the UK, advocacy has been 
especially important in relation to cases which involve politically unpopular and marginalised 
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groups, such as asylum seekers.195 The human rights organisation Liberty views litigation and 
campaigning as ‘mutually reinforcing enterprises’ and notes that success in campaigning 
terms has sometimes arisen from unsuccessful legal challenges.196 The article ‘Evaluating the 
Impact of Human Rights Litigation’, situates this aspect of the model in the context of wider 
argument concerning the relationship between litigation and other forms of social action. It 
argues that concerns about a ‘crisis of legalism’ – that is, about the fetishizing of human 
rights claims in their legal form above their operation in the political community – may be 
overstated.197 The article ventures that civil society activists both in established and newer 
democracies have used litigation instrumentally along with other forms of political 
campaigning and social mobilisation to achieve human rights goals (and draws on evidence 
presented in Poverty, Inequality and Human Rights to substantiate this point).   
 
Returning to the implementation cycle, it is suggested that effective institutional 
application involves monitoring and review mechanisms, training, and the ‘translation’ and 
dissemination of principles in case law in a way that makes sense to practitioners’ everyday 
roles. My research indicates that these systems vary considerably between authorities and that 
the lessons of case law do not consistently filter down to those on the frontline. To maximize 
the potential for human rights litigation to translate judgments into the desired behaviour 
change across sectors, I endorse Klug’s proposed approach of ‘smart compliance’: that is, 
providing guidance to public authorities on the implications of human rights case law which 
extend beyond the public authority and specific facts raised by a particular case in ways that 
may not be immediately apparent.198 In recent years, such guidance has been developed by 
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the EHRC and various public authorities.199 However, my research leads me to conclude that 
the absence until 2007 of a human rights commission in Britain charged with this role of 
promoting human rights principles and translating the lessons of case law into effective 
guides to practice has led to the HRA being significantly under-sold and under-exploited 
(Critical Review, Chapter 2). 
 
3.4  Identifying impact: the evidentiary challenge     
Gready notes that the human rights movement has historically had an ambivalent and 
inconsistent attitude towards evidence-based justifications and evaluation of its work.200 Such 
caution is understandable. Human rights proponents may justifiably mistrust the notion that 
whatever ‘works’ is right, ‘the classic human rights trump over the dominant utilitarian 
calculus for decision-making’.201 Cost-benefit analyses of human rights-based decisions 
appear especially objectionable, since they shift debate from the moral and legal terrain to 
one in which rights - and the interests of those that claim them - might be deemed 
expendable.202 Yet I agree with Gready that justifications in terms of evidence and 
effectiveness are required if human rights-based practice is to expand beyond (in the UK 
context) its still low and uneven level of development. Without such an evidence base, human 
rights practitioners must rely either on unsubstantiated claims or moral exhortations, neither 
of which is likely to sway decision-makers who are as yet unpersuaded. 
 
The imperative, I argue, is to develop evaluatory frameworks which are congruent with 
the strategic priorities of human rights and do not seek externally to determine or distort or 
them. Moreover, such frameworks need to reflect the dual function of human rights as, on the 
one hand, a framework to critique public policy and, on the other, a framework within which 
to shape and deliver services. Within these parameters, evaluations of human rights-based 
practice need to address the following question: are interventions which choose to privilege 
human rights as a framework for decision-making preferable to alternatives that could be 
pursued with similar resources and which at least aim to produce similar – human rights 
compliant - outcomes? If so, in what ways are they preferable?  
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In Evaluating the Impact of Human Rights-Based Interventions, I propose an approach 
to evaluation which addresses these requirements. I suggest (Chapter 1) that one prima facie 
benefit of viewing human rights as a means as well as a goal - ‘using human rights to achieve 
human rights’ - is that it helps to ensure that human rights are respected and promoted at each 
stage of a process or activity and not only at some supposed end-point. I examine (Chapter 2) 
what it means in practical terms to embrace human rights as a framework for organisational 
change – to use human rights ‘along the journey’ as well as viewing them as the goal to be 
achieved (see also section 3.2 above). I explore (Chapter 5) the types of change that human 
rights-based interventions may seek to achieve, conceptualising these as shown in Figure 2:  
 
Figure 2:   A human rights-based model of change 
 
 
I use this framework to analyse previous evaluations of human rights-based practice 
(Chapter 10).203 Overall, evaluative work in the UK is still at an early stage and has a number 
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of limitations. In particular, evaluations are often preoccupied with matters of process (the 
institutional application of human rights) and have not extended to consideration of outcomes 
(the results of that application, in the form of changes to knowledge and understanding, 
attitudes, perceptions, experience and the substantive realisation of human rights).    
 
These limitations reflect the methodological challenges inherent in evaluating rights-
based practice. For example, some of the most compelling evidence – yet among the hardest 
to identify - is that which captures fine-grained changes within a particular service or setting, 
such as the reformulation of individuals’ self-perception and perception of others when they 
are exposed to the idea of human rights. Similarly persuasive, yet elusive, is evidence about 
the way in which relationships change between providers and users of overtly rights-
respecting services, becoming, according to some evaluations, less conflictual and more 
respectful (see also section 3.2 (ii) above).204 Such attitudinal and behaviour changes may be 
diffused unevenly across an organisation. They may ebb and flow over time as personnel and 
priorities change.  
 
Policy and practice which is initially embedded as part of a human rights framework 
may, over time, lose its human rights ‘label’ and it may therefore be harder to establish a 
causal link between the human rights-based intervention and particular outcomes.205 This 
effect has been observed in evaluations of longstanding human rights-based initiatives, where 
approaches to decision-making become habitual and their provenance is forgotten or is poorly 
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understood, especially among newer staff. An example is the assessments performed by local 
authorities to determine whether people with no recourse to public funds should be supported 
to prevent destitution. It was apparent in my research on the impact of Limbuela that whereas 
in some local authorities assessment forms made express reference to Article 3 ECHR, and 
even to the Limbuela judgment itself, in others this linkage was omitted (see section 3.3 (i)). 
As such assessments become standardised over time, the connection with human rights 
standards and case law may become increasingly obscure. Such an outcome is not necessarily 
problematic in and of itself, yet it may make the evidence for the impact of the HRA harder to 
determine and require careful design of methodology in order to capture it.  
 
Timescales are also a matter of sensitivity: a service into which human rights are 
explicitly introduced may appear to deteriorate in the short- to medium-term as individuals 
appropriate the language of human rights to describe their conditions or claims or feel 
emboldened to access complaints mechanisms. Indeed, from a human rights perspective,  
such outcomes may be viewed as indicators of success. Substantive beneficial outcomes, so 
far as they can be identified, may be more visible in the longer term. In Evaluating the Impact 
of Human Rights-Based Interventions (Chapters 3-7), I propose various ways of mitigating 
these methodological problems; for example, in relation to the design of evaluations and the 
framing of objectives in a way which is sensitive to the types of change to which human 
rights-based interventions aspire.  
 
So far in this section, I have discussed the difficulties of identifying impact at the level 
of a specific organisation or service. Still more problematic is the identification of impact on 
a larger scale. Some accounts of the HRA make Panglossian statements, e.g. that the 
application of human rights principles will ‘inevitably lead to improved outcomes’ across 
public services; however, evidence is not adduced for such expansive claims.206 I suggest 
(Critical Review, Chapter 3) that the evidence base consists of a rich but still fragmentary 
array of experience demonstrating a range of beneficial impacts at the level of individual 
services – many of them anecdotal, a few more systematically analysed. There is no prima 
facie reason why these beneficial impacts could not be replicated in other services; however, 
more evaluative research is required to make such a case beyond doubt.  
 
3.5 Human rights, poverty and social exclusion  
The chapter ‘Limits and Achievements of the HRA’ examines how the HRA has, from its 
enactment, been isolated from other aspects of public policy which it might have been 
expected to underpin. The HRA was not the only expansive declaration of intent by the 
Labour administration to transform society. Another was the promise to end child poverty 
                                                          
206
 Audit Commission, Human Rights: Improving Public Service Delivery, as above n 77, p.8. 
52 
 
within a generation and build a ‘popular welfare state’ which would tackle the fundamental 
causes of poverty, social exclusion and community decay.207 However, the two narratives 
were largely disconnected from each other by the Labour government, both rhetorically and 
in public policy. The twin aspirations to promote human rights and tackle poverty were like 
trains on parallel tracks, sometimes accelerating and at other times slowing down or 
reversing, but with no shared timetable and only rare exchanges of passengers. I found no 
express reference to the HRA in key documents setting out government strategy or charting 
progress in relation to poverty and social exclusion. Reports on poverty and social exclusion 
after 2007 refer to the creation of the EHRC but there is no indication that human rights were 
a significant driver of strategy. Some documents refer to ‘rights and responsibilities’ (the two 
terms invariably being bracketed together) but this is primarily in the context of compulsion 
and conditionality in relation to welfare benefits. Similarly, official documents explaining the 
HRA to public authorities or reviewing its implementation do not refer to poverty or social 
exclusion, suggesting that the framers of the Act and those charged with promoting its 
application did not aspire for it to improve the lives of communities affected by structural 
deprivation.208 
 
The Child Poverty Act (CPA) 2010 illustrates the way in which the Labour government 
largely kept human rights and anti-poverty strategies apart.209 As Palmer notes, although 
aspects of the CPA contribute to the realisation of some socio-economic rights, the language 
of human rights was absent from the moral justification for prioritising the needs of children 
and families in the official consultation that preceded the Act.210 It should also be noted that 
in at least one policy area – that of asylum – the human rights and anti-exclusion ‘trains’ 
travelled in opposite directions, producing a grotesque disparity between the language of 
                                                          
207
 T. Blair, ‘Beveridge revisited: a welfare state for the 21st century’, Beveridge Lecture, Toynbee Hall, London, 
18 March 1999. 
208
 See, e.g., Department of Constitutional Affairs, Review of the Implementation of the Human Rights Act, as 
above n 74.  
209
 The Apprenticeship, Skills, Children and Learning Act 2009 is a rare example of a piece of Westminster 
legislation that both explicitly embraced obligations to fulfil a social or economic right – in this case, the right to 
education – and that was recognised as doing so in government analysis of the Bill. Hunt observes that generally, 
even where a Bill includes measures that contribute to implementation of human rights obligations, this ‘does 
not feature in [the government’s] own analysis of the Bill’s human rights implications’;  M. Hunt (2010) 
‘Enhancing Parliament’s role in relation to economic and social rights’, European Human Rights Law Review 3: 
242. 
210
 E. Palmer (2010) ‘The Child Poverty Act 2010: holding government to account for promises in a 
recessionary climate?’ European Human Rights Law Review 3: 307. 
53 
 
universal rights and the deliberate dehumanisation of an already impoverished and 
marginalised group.211    
 
This disconnection at the level of public policy raises the larger question of whether, as 
Clements asks, the HRA is, in itself, capable of materially improving the lives of those who 
experience chronic poverty and social exclusion – or whether, indeed, it may exacerbate their 
difficulties given the tendency of better-resourced and more assertive members of society to 
monopolise the legal process.212 The HRA does not, of course, contain the type of socio-
economic rights that might underpin a strong egalitarian or redistributive agenda. However, 
as is now well-established, the historic demarcation between civil and political and socio-
economic rights, and the associated negative-positive dichotomy, is not firm, either in theory 
or practice.213 As Palmer notes, over time, a dynamic approach to the interpretation of ECHR 
rights has created legal avenues for the protection of vulnerable individuals in respect of 
claims to receive a minimum standard of living consistent with their basic human dignity and 
the maintenance of their physical and psychological integrity.214 Both the ECtHR and 
domestic courts have incrementally recognised that the protection of ECHR rights may not 
only require ‘hands-off’ restraint by states parties but may also give rise to  positive 
obligations of both a procedural and substantive kind (as discussed in section 3.2 (i)). 
However, as I established in section 3.3, the impact of human rights judgments on decision-
making by public authorities has, so far as it can be determined, frequently been belated, 
inconsistent, circumscribed or peripheral. Thus, I return to the imperative established in 
section 1.1 (iii) for public authorities proactively to apply human rights standards and 
principles in the design and delivery of services if the Act is to hold promise for those who 
are effectively stranded from the prospect of legal remedy.  
 
Further, my research engages with the element of a human rights culture that I have 
called the ‘demand side’; i.e. social action by campaigning and advocacy groups to pursue 
accountability inside and outside the courtroom for infringements of rights or failures to 
protect rights. Such activism - suitably financed, organised and sustained by the involvement 
of human rights legal expertise - is identified as the wellspring of the ‘rights revolution’ 
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conceptualised by Epp.215 The report Poverty, Inequality and Human Rights and the chapter 
‘Limits and Achievements of the HRA’ identify a growing body of practice among civil 
society organisations in the UK that uses human rights principles and standards (drawn both 
from the Convention and international human rights treaties) to promote and facilitate the 
initiation of rights claims and to advocate for rights-based changes to law or policy. For 
example, the British Institute of Human Rights (BIHR) has supported London-based 
organisations working with and for people facing social injustice to use human rights to 
strengthen their influence with national and local policy makers.216 Some used human rights 
to seek the revision or abandonment of policies or practices including the practice of waking 
rough sleepers in the night and hosing down their sleeping areas; the lack of ‘joined-up’ 
services resulting in high numbers of women becoming homeless on release from prison; and 
policies which result in social services departments refusing to support undocumented 
migrant families and threatening to take their children into care due to the family having no 
recourse to public funds. BIHR also documents examples of carers, advocates and 
professionals raising arguments about dignity, inhuman and degrading treatment, and the 
right to private and family life to secure changes in the practices of local authorities, care 
homes and hospitals.217 As noted in section 3.2 (ii), the Participation and Practice of Rights 
project in Belfast provides a further example of a civil society initiative to use the normative 
content of human rights to frame advocacy and pursue accountability.   
 
The report Poverty, Inequality and Human Rights (Chapter 3) also explores the growth 
of civil society (and academic) practice which uses international human rights obligations and 
mechanisms to pursue accountability for state action or inaction which impinges on the 
realisation of rights. These include the rights-based auditing of macro-economic policies 
(especially the setting of local and national budgets);218 engagement with ‘shadow reporting’ 
mechanisms and UN special procedures as a strategic way of taking domestic concerns onto 
an international stage (’Limits and Achievements of the HRA’, pp. 150-51);219 and the 
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development of indicators to monitor over time whether duty bearers are meeting their human 
rights obligations.220  
 
Overall, my research suggests that civil society activity in the UK to integrate human 
rights and efforts to combat structural deprivation and social exclusion is fragmented both 
geographically and in terms of the actors involved (Poverty, Inequality and Human Rights, 
Chapter 6). Nevertheless, strategic integration of these two areas of work is steadily 
increasing given the potential of the human rights framework to strengthen moral, political 
and legal arguments for the UK government to ensure a threshold of decency in meeting the 
elementary needs of the population in the context of severe public austerity and the 
restructuring of social security.  
 
3.6 The context of devolution 
In this section, I synthesise my findings in respect of evidence of the differential impact and 
implementation of the HRA in public services in different parts of the UK. 
 
The entrenching of human rights as a core pillar of the devolution settlements has 
helped to secure stronger institutional commitment for the protection and promotion of 
human rights in the devolved nations than at the level of the UK government. This is most 
visible in Northern Ireland where, following a commitment made in the Belfast (Good Friday) 
Agreement, the then Labour Government established the Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission (NIHRC) in 1999, before the HRA had even come into force in England.221 The 
Commission's functions include promoting understanding and awareness of the importance of 
human rights across Northern Ireland and reviewing the adequacy and effectiveness of law 
and practice in order to advise government on measures which should be taken to protect 
human rights.222 Most notably, human rights were integral to the fundamental reform of 
policing in Northern Ireland.223 The Northern Ireland Policing Board monitors the 
performance of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) systematically for compliance 
with the HRA224 and human rights are also embedded in the PSNI Code of Ethics.225  
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In Scotland, too, there is evidence of political and institutional commitment to human 
rights. Notably, the 2003 Homelessness etc (Scotland) Act resulted from a policy 
commitment to using legally enforceable rights to tackle homelessness (Poverty, Inequality 
and Human Rights, p. 36). The Act has been described as ‘the closest thing to the practical 
implementation of the right to housing the world has yet seen’.226 It identified specific rights 
and correlative obligations held by specific entities and enshrined a commitment that, by 
2012, all unintentionally homeless people in Scotland would have the right to settled 
accommodation.227  
 
In Wales, the political and institutional commitment to human rights is most visible in 
respect of the priority accorded by the Welsh Assembly Government to children’s rights. The 
Children and Families (Wales) Measure 2010 encompasses a broader approach to child 
poverty than the UK Child Poverty Act, encapsulating thirteen aims, some of which are 
clearly connected to human rights principles, such as non-discrimination, participation and 
survival and development. The Rights of Children and Young Persons (Wales) Measure 2011 
made Wales the first nation in the UK to incorporate the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC) into domestic law. This measure imposes a legal duty on Welsh ministers to 
have due regard to the rights and obligations in the CRC and its Optional Protocols in two 
stages: from May 2012 in the making of new law or policy and review of existing policies 
and from May 2014 in respect of all their functions.228 Wales was also the first nation in the 
UK to appoint a Children’s Commissioner, whose mandate is based on the CRC,229 and an 
Older Person’s Commissioner, who is legally obliged to have regard to the UN Principles for 
Older Persons.230 
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 Yet policy and legislative innovations have not translated comprehensively into the 
realisation of rights. The Scottish Human Rights Commission, in research undertaken to 
inform the development of a Scottish National Action Plan for Human Rights, finds that, 
while there are ‘frequent and explicit’ references to human rights in the operation of law and 
institutions in Scotland, processes to enact policies and strategies are rarely rights-focused.231 
Moreover, the material outcomes of policies indicated ‘the greatest risk to the realisation of 
human rights in Scotland’, with divergent practice even in areas with human rights-based 
laws and strategies.232 An unpublished survey of Scottish public authorities conducted by 
Amnesty International in 2006 found that two-thirds of respondents either did not understand 
the meaning of the Act or could not provide any evidence of steps taken to ensure compliance 
(Critical Review, pp. 25-26). In Wales, too, an ‘implementation gap’ has been identified 
between ‘national policy rhetoric’ on children’s rights and local delivery.233 In the Critical 
Review report (p. 29), I identify a disjuncture between a rising edifice of bodies, legislation 
and governance principles drawn from human rights and the struggle to embed human rights 
approaches within public authorities in Wales. Welsh interviewees also drew attention to 
endemic problems which make it harder for people in Wales to secure their human rights, 
including a dearth of sources of specialist legal advice (Critical Review, p. 31).234    
 
As in England, there is evidence of significant variation between public authorities in 
respect of the application of human rights at an organisational level. The State Hospital in 
Carstairs, a high-security forensic mental health facility, has been praised for its ‘international 
class best practice’ in embedding a human rights-based approach.235 Moreover, interviewees 
in all three devolved nations spoke of a more promising environment for the application of 
human rights in public authorities in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales as compared to 
England (Critical Review, pp. 23-31; Poverty, Inequality and Human Rights, Chapter 6). This 
was attributed to various factors. Some are common to all three devolved nations, such as the 
fact that in smaller nations, ministers are viewed as being more accessible to non-government 
actors and as enjoying greater scope to integrate human rights stands and principles across 
multiple services, as compared to their counterparts in the UK government (Critical Review, 
p. 24). My research further suggests that the political environment surrounding the HRA in 
the devolved nations is significantly more benign than at Westminster (with, for example, no 
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strident voices calling for the repeal of the Act) and that public service practitioners view this 
difference in climate as critical to efforts to embed the HRA in service delivery (Critical 
Review, p. 23-31). In Wales and Scotland, the increasing momentum behind the co-
production of public services offers significant scope for the integration of human rights 
standards and principles.236 Integrated equality and human rights approaches might also be 
expected to gain ground in Wales and Scotland in view of the specific equality duties which 
(unlike in England) require public authorities to demonstrate their compliance with specific 
equality objectives. Further, the devolved administrations have proved more ready to adopt 
international human rights treaties as an explicit basis for law and policy making than the UK 
government.  
 
However, these broad commonalities should not be permitted to mask the 
distinctiveness of the political environments which have developed in each of the devolved 
nations since 1999. For example, in Northern Ireland, human rights ‘literacy’ among civil 
society organisations is substantially greater than elsewhere in the UK due partly to the 
extensive consultation on a Bill of Rights, led by the NIHRC and involving a wide range of 
actors over more than a decade (Developing a Bill of Rights, pp. 17-21). At the same time, 
interviewees in Northern Ireland report that sectarian differences have complicated efforts to 
(among other initiatives) integrate human rights into anti-poverty strategies given the lack of 
consensus about matters of resource allocation (Poverty, Inequality and Human Rights, p. 42).  
 
 Overall, my research suggests that differences between devolved and non-devolved 
governance in respect of the existing state of implementation of the HRA should not be 
overstated. Generalisations are perilous, either within or between devolved nations, since the 
visible influence of the HRA on public authorities is highly variable.237 Yet the legal and 
political context for the future development of systematic approaches to human rights 
implementation is generally more propitious in the devolved nations than outside them.          
   
3.7  Conclusion        
In this section, I return to the overarching question posed in my introduction to part 3: how 
far has a human rights culture materialised in public services in the UK since the enactment 
of the HRA just over a decade ago?  
 
My research published in 2009 (for which the fieldwork was conducted mainly in 2008) 
– Critical Review, Evaluating the Impact of Selected Cases under the HRA and ‘Evaluating 
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the Impact of Human Rights Litigation’ – concluded that, so far as public authorities viewed 
human rights law as relevant to the design and delivery of services, they regarded it 
predominantly as an area of legal risk and hence a technical problem to be managed, rather 
than as a source of normative values and a framework for habitual decision-making. I 
identified highly variable patterns both within and between public authorities of knowledge, 
institutional commitment, exercise of professional judgment and fear of sanction. I concluded 
that a human rights culture had largely failed to materialise among public authorities in the 
UK, but that there were greater grounds for optimism in the devolved nations (as discussed in 
section 3.6).   
 
I indicated various reasons why this might have happened, including the substantial 
delay after the enactment of the HRA in establishing human rights commissions across the 
UK to promote understanding and implementation of it; the failure to spread responsibility 
for promoting human rights standards and principles beyond what is now the Ministry of 
Justice (and, belatedly, the Department of Health); and the adversarial political and media 
discourse surrounding the HRA, which has dwelt almost exclusively on matters of terrorism, 
asylum and immigration and the rights of unpopular groups rather than the application of 
human rights standards and principles to public services at large. However, I also identified 
striking exceptions in the form of public authorities, or specific teams or initiatives within 
them, which demonstrate what an overtly rights-respecting service looks (or could look) like. 
These authorities - ‘laboratories’ of the human rights-based approach - have begun to 
generate a valuable reservoir of evidence and experience on which to build.   
 
The question arises: in the five years since I began my qualitative research, has progress 
been made on the embedding of human rights standards and principles in public services that 
would give rise to a more positive overall conclusion in respect of the impact of the HRA on 
public services? Notwithstanding the negative discourse that still surrounds the HRA, such an 
effect might be expected given the passage of time to consolidate human rights-based 
decision-making, combined with the likely impact of more recent case law. Indeed, there is 
some documentary evidence of such cumulative impact, at least in some areas of law and 
policy. This includes the almost 3,000 responses to the two consultation documents issued by 
the Commission on a Bill of Rights, especially those from organisations with expertise in 
specific areas of law and policy.238 For example, the Family Rights Group, a leading 
advocacy organisation concerned with local authority children’s services, states that the HRA 
has made ‘a profound difference’ to families affected and has been relied upon extensively in 
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family proceedings concerning fairness in decision-making procedures, removal of children 
from the home and adoption.239   
 
At the same time, there is evidence of persistent failure by public authorities to embed 
human rights standards, consistent with the findings in my publications. In its Human Rights 
Review of 2012, the EHRC states that ‘there is widespread lack of awareness of the benefits 
of a human rights approach within the health and social care sector … The evidence 
consistently points to staff members not making the link between human rights and the care 
they are supposed to be giving’.240 The EHRC’s inquiry into older people and home care in 
England found numerous instances of poor care and treatment, some of which amounted to 
violations of Article 3.241 With notable exceptions, local authorities were generally found to 
have a poor grasp of their positive obligations and human rights were integrated into 
commissioning and procurement of care services only superficially, if at all. A follow-up 
survey of local authorities found that a small number are implementing a systematic human 
rights-based approach to the assessment, commissioning and monitoring of care services.242 
Around two-thirds of local authorities in England responded, and some three-quarters of 
respondent authorities had taken some action to review their commissioning practice in the 
light of the inquiry’s recommendations.243 This in itself suggests modest progress with 
respect to the ‘mainstreaming’ of human rights considerations in public policy and a greater 
degree of responsiveness than was evident in comparable surveys in the early-mid 2000s.244  
 
It is beyond the scope of this statement to offer a comprehensive analysis of the 
current ‘state of play’ with regards to human rights implementation in public services. 
However, in part 6, I propose ways in which further research in this area might be framed.  
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4. CONTROVERSIES ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Integral to the political conception of human rights introduced in section 1.1 is the 
inevitability of disagreement about their meaning and scope.245 If human rights are not only 
legal but also moral claims on the exercise of power, existing beyond positive law, then they 
must invite public deliberation and argument about their content, about which rights should 
prevail when they come into conflict, and about the justifications for interfering with or 
derogating from them. As a framework of norms which societies use in deliberating about 
how to act, human rights may exclude some options (such as torture or capital punishment) 
but will not necessarily yield a definitively ‘correct’ one.246 Thus, the presence of 
disagreement about rights is not only inevitable but also desirable within a democratic legal 
order.  
 
In this part of my statement, I examine how my research has engaged with the 
controversies that surround human rights protection in the UK. I do so with respect to three 
broad themes: first, the conduct of debate about the HRA and the UK’s relationship with the 
ECtHR (section 4.1); secondly, initiatives to create a new bill of rights for the UK (section 
4.2); and thirdly, a particularly contentious area in law and public policy – the interaction of 
human rights, equality and religion or belief (section 4.3). I draw some broad conclusions in 
section 4.4. 
 
4.1 The conduct of debate about human rights  
In this section I examine the conduct of debate about human rights, including (i) the factual 
and normative basis of critiques of the HRA and the ECtHR and (ii) evidence as to the state 
of public opinion about human rights and the way in which different measures of public 
opinion are invoked within political discourse about human rights.  
 
 In Developing a Bill of Rights, ‘Lessons from Overseas’ and The UK and the European 
Court of Human Rights, I examine the political and media discourse surrounding the 
proposed creation of a new bill of rights. This includes discourse about both the HRA and the 
UK’s relationship with the ECtHR, since the case for replacing the HRA with a new bill of 
rights is expressed as arising from perceived problems in both areas. As noted in section 1.1 
(ii), the culture of justification requires (in Mureinik’s words) that public officials articulate 
the reasons that link evidence to decisions. Accordingly, my research interrogates the factual 
basis of public argument about human rights and highlights instances where erroneous 
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information and/or flawed methodology have transgressed the requirements of open 
justification.  
 
(i) Debate about the HRA   
The Conservative Party first pledged to abolish the HRA in 2001.247 Political discourse has 
since centred on the purported impact of the HRA on efforts to tackle crime and terrorism, a 
narrative which became dominant after the attacks on the United States in 2001, Madrid in 
2004 and London in 2005.248 The human rights culture foreseen by the architects of the HRA 
is now invoked more often in pejorative than laudatory terms: the Act has been variously 
blamed for creating an infantilised, individualistic and socially irresponsible culture and for 
being a contributory cause of the English riots in 2011.249 As noted in section 3.2 (iii), senior 
ministers have asserted that the HRA is commonly misinterpreted and misapplied, with 
deleterious effects of public safety; yet evidence has not been adduced to suggest that such 
instances are widespread or intractable.250  
 
Debate about the way in which the HRA operates in the domestic context has 
sometimes been prone to misrepresentation by politicians, including senior ministers. An 
egregious example is the response to the judgment in a case concerning the requirement that 
those convicted of sexual offences and sentenced to more than 30 months in prison must be 
placed on the Sex Offenders Register for life, with no possibility of review.251 The Supreme 
Court found the lack of any provision for review a disproportionate breach of the right to 
respect for private life under Article 8 HRA, resulting in a declaration of incompatibility. The 
response of the Government was to suggest that the declaration of incompatibility was 
binding and necessitated legislative reform to comply, when in fact it was open to the 
government to decline to legislate in accordance with the judgment.252 Phillipson ventures 
that so striking was the misrepresentation of the judgment and its legal consequences that the 
only explanation for the Government’s response was its wish to generate hostility to the HRA 
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and the senior judiciary in general.253 This interpretation is given added plausibility by the 
express linkage created by the Prime Minster David Cameron between this ‘offensive’ 
judgment and the promised creation of a ‘British Bill of Rights’ which would, he said, ensure 
that such decisions would in future be made by Parliament rather than the courts.254  
 
The failure to acknowledge that the HRA already gives parliament the final say with 
respect to declarations of incompatibility breached the comity between different branches of 
government. Moreover, it fell short of the requirements of open justification for official 
action or omission implicating human rights proposed in section 1.1 (ii) - requirements which 
could hypothetically have been met via a reasoned explanation of the Government’s 
disagreement with the Supreme Court as to the balance to be struck between the privacy 
interests of sex offenders and public safety. I conclude that public argument about judicial 
decisions must, at a minimum, rest upon an accurate account of judgments and the principle/s 
they establish, as well as of their legal status and consequences. 
 
(ii) Debate about the European Court of Human Rights 
As documented in The UK and the European Court of Human Rights (Chapters 9 and 10) and 
Developing a Bill of Rights (Chapter 4), commentators, jurists and elected politicians, 
including senior Conservative ministers, have called for the UK to withdraw from the ECHR, 
temporarily255 or permanently,256 or to renegotiate the terms on which it applies to the UK257 - 
steps which no democracy has ever taken and which, to my knowledge, have not been 
proposed within mainstream political debate in any other Council of Europe state (The UK 
and the European Court of Human Rights, pp. 174-77).258 Critiques of the ECtHR have been 
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based on various grounds. Some criticisms may be straightforwardly refuted; e.g. those 
relating to the purported cost of adverse judgments to the UK;259 or the argument that the 
Court lacks legitimacy because its judges are unelected.260 
 
 Another common trope is the assertion (whether explicit or implicit) that the ECtHR 
has become increasingly prone to overrule without justification decisions taken by national 
authorities in the UK. In The UK and the European Court of Human Rights (pp. 30-36), I 
address this assertion in part by means of a statistical analysis of the UK’s record at the 
ECtHR.  I conclude that the UK’s ‘rate of defeat’ in Strasbourg has always been, and remains, 
extremely low. The rate of defeat is most meaningfully expressed as the proportion of 
applications against a state that ultimately result in an adverse judgment.261 Between 1999 
and 2010, of the nearly 12,000 applications brought against the UK, fewer than two per cent 
eventually resulted in a judgment finding at least one violation.262 This figure reflects the 
Court’s very high threshold for admissibility, which means that some ninety-seven per cent of 
applications fall at the first stage and only a few of substantial merit proceed to a judgment.   
 
This low rate of defeat equated to an average of about eighteen adverse judgments per 
year between 1999 and 2010.263 To be sure, compared to the very small numbers of 
judgments in 1970s and 1980s, the number of judgments concerning the UK increased 
markedly after the entry into force of Protocol 11 in November 1998, after which individuals 
had the right of direct petition to the Court without having to apply initially to the European 
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Commission of Human Rights.264 However, heightened hostility towards the ECtHR over the 
past decade cannot be explained by any increasing tendency on the part of the Court to find 
violations in cases involving the UK.265 Nor has there been an increase in recent years either 
in the number of applications lodged against the UK or the proportion of applications 
declared admissible by the Court (The UK and the European Court of Human Rights, p. 36). 
Further, there is no evidence that the UK fares worse at the ECtHR than other Council of 
States in respect, for example, of the proportion of applications against it that are deemed 
admissible or the proportion of all judgments against it that find at least one violation.266 
Indeed, one might have expected greater controversy about the UK’s relationship with the 
Convention system in previous decades when, despite the lower numbers overall, the UK, 
having accepted the right of individual petition comparatively early, accounted for a 
significantly higher proportion of applications and judgments than other states. As a snapshot, 
in 1983, the UK accounted for a third of all applications registered by the European 
Commission of Human Rights;267 three decades later, in the context of a greatly enlarged 
Council of Europe, it accounts for less than three per cent of pending applications.268 
 
My research has also analysed the nature of violations in all judgments against the UK, 
in order to  examine the concern that the ECtHR has become a ‘small claims’ court, 
preoccupied with matters that are more appropriately the province of national decision-
makers (The UK and the European Court of Human Rights, pp. 40-42).269 The Convention 
right most commonly violated in UK cases was Article 6 (the right to a fair trial and length of 
proceedings; 30 per cent of adverse judgments), followed by Article 8 (the right to a private 
and family life; 17 per cent) and the Article 5 (the right to liberty and security; 16 per cent). A 
sizeable minority of judgments (around eight per cent) involved a violation of either the right 
to life or the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. I conclude that the 
statistics relating to the UK do not, in and of themselves, substantiate the assertion that the 
ECtHR has become a small claims court: while judgments against the UK have been 
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relatively few in number, they have frequently been serious in nature, concerning both basic 
civil liberties and Convention rights considered to be of the most fundamental importance. 
 
 Statistical evidence alone does not adequately address the nature of the controversy 
about the Court and its perceived impact on the UK. Criticisms of the Strasbourg Court 
advanced by jurists and politicians have focused upon its allegedly over-expansive approach 
(The UK and the European Court of Human Rights, pp. 91-98). This argument is primarily 
based on the propositions that the Convention is being applied in ways that would not have 
been foreseen by those who drafted it in 1949-50, or that it is taking an over-activist approach 
which interferes unduly with decisions made by national bodies, especially parliaments.270 It 
is suggested that the Court thereby seeks inappropriately to impose uniform standards on 
member states.271 Particular controversy surrounds the appropriate response to the ECtHR’s 
decisions on the disenfranchisement of convicted prisoners,272 which has led the UK 
Government to contemplate breaking treaty obligations.273 Disputation has also surrounded 
the ECtHR judgment which, combined with decisions of domestic tribunals, deferred the 
deportation to Jordan of the terror suspect known as Abu Qatada until assurances had been 
obtained that he would not face the risk of a trial at which evidence obtained by torture might 
be used (The UK and the European Court of Human Rights, pp. 56-58 and 128-31).274 
Conservative ministers have also criticised the ways in which the right to respect for family 
life (Article 8 ECHR) has been interpreted and applied by both domestic courts and the 
ECtHR in cases relating to deportation so as, it is argued, unjustifiably to prevent deportation, 
particularly of foreign criminals (The UK and the European Court of Human Rights, pp. 93-
97).275  
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 These challenges to the ECtHR’s legitimacy and authority have caused considerable 
disquiet among senior figures in the Court.276 The report The UK and the European Court of 
Human Rights responds to them in various ways. First, it argues (pp. 98-102) that it has 
always been a fundamental principle that the Convention should be interpreted and applied 
by taking account of changes in society, morals and laws, as well as in technological and 
scientific developments – and that such a dynamic approach to interpretation is a common 
feature of international treaties, which permits those interpreting and applying them to take 
account of new, or previously neglected, threats to human rights.277 It ventures (pp. 110-13) 
that this approach has permitted the development in recent years of positive Convention 
obligations, the effect of which has been to provide increased human rights protection for 
vulnerable groups, such as the victims of rape, domestic violence and human trafficking. 
Further, the report observes (pp. 102-106) that a dynamic approach to interpretation is not 
alien to the common law tradition; judges in domestic courts are used to applying an 
evolutive approach to the common law and in interpreting statutes (as, for example, the 
development of case law with respect to marital rape and the criminalisation of 
homosexuality attests). 
 
The report examines the critiques of a number of particularly contentious judgments 
and finds that, in some instances, they are based on an exaggeration or misconception of the 
principle established in the judgment and/or its practical import. Notably, in the Hirst 
judgment concerning the disenfranchisement of convicted prisoners, both press reports and 
the pronouncements of politicians have frequently failed to make clear that it was the blanket 
nature of the legislative ban that the ECtHR found problematic, not the ban as such, and that 
the UK Government has considerable discretion as to precisely how it amends the law to 
remedy the violation (The UK and the European Court of Human Rights, pp. 126-27). My 
research has also highlighted a degree of inconsistency in responses to Strasbourg case law: 
for example, like Hirst, the case of S and Marper v UK concerned an indiscriminate measure: 
in this case, the power to retain fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles of all persons 
who had been acquitted of offences as well as those who had been convicted of offences, in 
violation of Article 8 ECHR.278 However, the decision in S and Marper suffered nothing like 
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the opprobrium directed at Hirst and, indeed, was ‘widely applauded in British political and 
legal circles’.279 In the light of such inconsistency, I suggest that calls for the UK to consider 
taking the drastic step of withdrawing from the Convention on the basis of particular 
judgments which frustrate the will of parliament appear, at best, insufficiently grounded and, 
at worst, opportunistic.        
 
 As discussed in section 1.1 (iv), in the past decade disagreement about rights in the UK 
has dwelt with increasing intensity on the question of which institution should be the ultimate 
arbiter of matters concerning human rights: the courts - including the Strasbourg Court - or 
parliament. Hunt, Hooper and Yowell deplore this turn in debate, since persistent 
disagreement about the question ‘who decides?’ threatens what they view as the ‘fragile new 
consensus about the worth of human rights and of giving them legal form’.280   
 
 Senior UK judges have recently spoken of the ‘democratic deficit’ that they perceive as 
being created by the expansion of the scope of the rights protected under the ECHR and the 
tendency (as they see it) of the Strasbourg Court to ‘tread on matters of policy that are not for 
unelected judges, let alone international judges, to decide’.281 My research (including 
research I am currently conducting on the role of national parliaments in the implementation 
of ECtHR judgments; see part 6) leads me to make two observations about this critique. First, 
debate in the UK that emphasises the sovereignty of parliament does not always acknowledge 
the implications of this position when it is applied in the international, as opposed to the 
domestic, legal context. The question of supremacy has a particular significance in the 
context of the ECtHR in view of the undertaking of the state under Article 46(1) ECHR to 
abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which it is a party. In the light of this 
obligation, the assertion of parliamentary sovereignty as overriding final decisions of the 
ECtHR risks fatally undermining the Convention system, which rests upon the legally-
binding nature of the obligations placed on individual states, as well as the principle of the 
collective guarantee of human rights which is embodied in the Convention and its machinery 
of supervision. Such a position – that parliamentary sovereignty should indeed outweigh 
these foundational principles of the Convention system – may be honestly held; however, it is 
imperative that, at a minimum, those who espouse such a position should acknowledge the 
far-reaching implications it holds for the Convention system and for the UK’s place within 
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that system. Where these implications are ignored or downplayed the resulting debate risks 
becoming both ill-informed and parochial.282   
 
 Secondly, discussion about a democratic deficit created by the ECtHR frequently fails 
to acknowledge that there are differing concepts of democracy and of the relationship 
between human rights and democracy. Rather, a particular conception of democracy – which 
views it as existing in tension with human rights – is sometimes assumed. As argued in 
section 1.1 (ii), within the conceptual framework of law as a culture of justification, which 
rests upon the principles of accountability and participation, human rights are viewed as 
constitutive, rather than constraining, of democracy. This is my preferred conception, which I 
develop in my research on Developing a Bill of Rights in relation to the principles and 
methods by which bills of rights are created (see section 4.2 below). Again, there may be 
valid disagreements about the relationship between human rights and democracy; however, 
informed debate can only proceed if such differences – and their implications for the 
institutional machinery of rights protection - are acknowledged and their normative 
foundations made explicit.   
 
(iii) Public opinion about human rights 
The unpopularity of the HRA is widely asserted in public discourse, but the nature and extent 
of discontent is rarely substantiated.283 My publications have examined data relating to public 
opinion in Britain both about the HRA and about a bill of rights.284 In broad terms, evidence 
from quantitative and qualitative surveys over the past decade has consistently suggested that 
the existence of a law in the UK to protect rights and freedoms in line with international 
standards is popular, as are the specific rights contained in the HRA (Critical Review, pp. 
174-77; Developing a Bill of Rights, pp. 69-70).285 Human rights in the abstract are 
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commonly associated with positive values such as fairness and protecting the vulnerable.286 
As discussed in the Critical Review (Chapter 6), surveys suggest that hostility towards the 
HRA itself derives specifically from the way in which the Act is perceived to be interpreted 
or implemented so as to protect disproportionately ‘undeserving’ groups (identified in polls 
as refugees and asylum seekers, immigrants and criminals, among others).287 In addition, 
surveys suggest widespread ignorance about the way that the HRA works (e.g. in respect of 
the decision-making power of parliament vis-à-vis the courts) and a prevalent view that 
human rights are not relevant to everyday life or public services.288 Another persistent theme 
of surveys is public resentment at perceived ‘interference by Europe’ in national decision-
making on human rights, fuelled by the erroneous yet widespread understanding that the 
ECtHR is part of the European Union.289  
 
 Taken together, these factors constitute a significant image problem for the HRA; 
however, the evidence should not be misconstrued. Hostility to the HRA which derives from 
lack of knowledge and understanding should be distinguished from that which is connected to 
more deep-rooted sources of alienation. Nor should the vitriolic tone of some media coverage 
be taken as a proxy for public attitudes as a whole. The most recent research on public 
perceptions of rights in Britain suggests that around a quarter of the population is strongly 
supportive of human rights, while just over half are ether neutral or ambivalent; one in four 
held implacably hostile views about human rights.290 While this data is not disaggregated 
geographically, there are grounds for assuming that the balance of views may vary 
significantly between the different nations of the UK (see section 3.6).       
 
 Opinion surveys on a new bill of rights are inconsistent, as I discuss in Developing a 
Bill of Rights (pp. 70-71).291 In 2006, an ICM State of the Nation survey reported that more 
than three-quarters of those polled agreed that ‘Britain needs a Bill of Rights to protect the 
liberty of the individual’.292 As Klug notes, we may infer that even though the HRA can fairly 
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be described as a ‘bill of rights’, people in the UK do not necessarily recognise it as such.293 
The Hansard Society’s 2008 Audit of Political Engagement found significantly lower levels 
of enthusiasm.294 The issue of ‘whether Britain needs a new Bill of Rights’ scored third 
lowest out of 11 constitutional issues for public understanding at 28 per cent.295 Almost two-
thirds were ‘effectively neutral’ on the matter.296 The apparent discrepancy between the ICM 
and Hansard surveys is explicable in part by their methodology. The ICM poll gauged 
support for a new bill of rights in the context of specific rights it might contain, including the 
right to a fair trial by jury and the right to hospital treatment on the National Health Service 
within a reasonable time, each supported by almost 90 per cent of respondents. The Hansard 
survey did not discuss specific rights; it concluded that, compared with other constitutional 
issues, the question of whether Britain needs a new bill of rights is ‘among the most technical 
and the vaguest’ and has no ‘real resonance, at least when stated in these terms’.297 It cannot 
safely be inferred from the available polling data, then, that popular enthusiasm for a bill of 
rights in the abstract is proven. I consider the implications of these findings for the formation 
of a new UK bill of rights in the next section.   
 
4.2 Initiatives to create a new bill of rights for the UK 
In this section, I synthesise my research which has examined initiatives under successive 
governments to create a new bill of rights - variously termed a ‘British’ or ‘UK’ bill - to 
subsume or replace the HRA. I examine (i) the post-war tend towards ‘process-driven 
constitutionalism’; and (ii) the principles and methods which my research suggests are most 
likely to create a sense of democratic legitimacy for bills of rights. In (iii), I evaluate 
initiatives to create a new bill of rights under both the Labour and Conservative-led coalition 
governments in the light of the proposed principles and methods. 
 
(i) Bills of rights and process-driven constitutionalism   
While much commentary has focused on the possible content of a new UK bill of rights,298 
the process by which it might be created has invited less scrutiny. My research (Developing a 
Bill of Rights) addresses this omission by analysing the processes used to develop bills of 
rights (or proposed bills) in comparable common law jurisdictions. I examine the consultative 
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or deliberative processes followed in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Northern Ireland 
and identify aspects of the design of process that participants in the research considered to be 
of greatest importance and to be transferable between national contexts. I critically assess the 
Labour Government’s consultation on a Bill of Rights and Responsibilities in 2009-10 and 
the more recent Commission on a Bill of Rights in the light of this experience. Further, I 
examine both the normative and pragmatic reasons for inviting public engagement in the 
formation of a bill of rights and, based on this discussion, propose a set of principles that 
should underpin future processes.    
  
In Developing a Bill of Rights (Chapter 2), I establish that a characteristic of the more 
recent processes to develop bills of rights (at state/territory and federal level in Australia and 
in Northern Ireland) has been the premium placed on public participation and not solely elite 
negotiation. I connect these participatory endeavours to the normative proposition that 
the process by which a bill of rights is created is as important as the outcome if the document 
is to enjoy democratic legitimacy. In the chapter ‘Lessons from Overseas’, I adopt Peter’s 
definition of democratic legitimacy as ‘the normative concept that establishes under what 
conditions the members of a democratic constituency ought to respect a democratic 
decision’.299 Following a procedural (as opposed to substantive) conception of democratic 
legitimacy, Peter proposes that a prerequisite of democratic legitimacy is that the normative 
and empirical premises for proposals are subjected to ‘the scrutiny of an inclusive process of 
public deliberation’.300 This proposition is congruent with – and, in some ways, extends – the 
concept of law as a culture of justification outlined in section 1.1 (ii). I noted in that section 
that Mureinik’s conception of the culture of justification rests in part on the principle of 
participation: that people whose rights and interests are affected or determined by a law or 
policy should have the opportunity to participate in its formation. Peter’s approach expands 
upon how the requirement of participation is to be fulfilled, i.e. via public participation that, 
being ‘inclusive’, creates opportunities for participation for individuals or groups who are 
relatively powerless or unassertive or face other barriers to participation.        
 
My research also draws on other literature which examines the post-war trend towards 
process-driven constitutionalism, according to which human rights have emerged as both a 
right and a necessity in the formation of constitutional documents - and process has joined 
outcome as a necessary criterion for legitimating a new constitution.301 The United Nations 
Committee on Civil and Political Rights recognises a specific right to participate in choosing 
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or changing a constitution.302 Nedelsky argues that in order to justify constitutionally-
entrenched rights as constraints on democratic decision-making ‘the processes by which 
[rights] are defined must themselves be universally recognized as legitimate’.303 In addition 
to democratic legitimacy, participatory constitutional development has been associated with 
other benefits. Writing about the transition from authoritarian to democratic systems in 
Europe, Arato argues that ‘it is unthinkable that legitimate constitution making bypass 
extended public discussion’, one benefit being that such discussion permits the main actors to 
‘advance and defend positions for which normatively convincing arguments can be devised’ 
– again, an approach which is closely aligned with that of law as a culture of justification.304    
 
(ii) Principles for designing a bill of rights process 
While the right to participation is becoming established in law and theory, the means of 
realising that right in the formation of bills of rights, and the consequences for democratic 
legitimacy, are matters of debate and experimentation. The contribution of my research report 
Developing a Bill of Rights is to examine empirically the development of such processes from 
the 1982 Canadian Charter to the more recent processes in Australia and Northern Ireland 
(Chapter 2) and, having evaluated that experience in the light of the normative arguments 
considered above, to suggest approaches to their future design (Chapter 3). However, I do not 
take a prescriptive approach, recognising that the particular methods chosen may legitimately 
vary between different national (or sub-national) contexts. In addition (Chapter 6), I propose 
certain principles that should underpin such processes, to which I attach considerable 
normative significance. 
 
In Developing a Bill of Rights, I argue that the development of consultative and 
deliberative methodologies, including technology that permits ever more sophisticated forms 
of public engagement, have increased the legitimate expectation that the process of creating a 
bill of rights will be a participatory endeavour. In this statement, I focus particularly on the 
experiences in Australia and Northern Ireland as these have been more participatory than 
both earlier processes (Canada and New Zealand) and subsequent processes (the UK).     
 
In the Australian Capital Territory (2002),305 Victoria (2005),306 Western Australia 
(2007),307 and at the federal level (2008-09),308 energetic consultation processes were 
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designed which, over periods of a few months, variously used: community organising 
techniques; deliberative exercises; televised hearings; ‘town hall’ meetings; roadshows; 
social media; materials for schools and other creative forms of public engagement 
(Developing a Bill of Rights, pp. 10-17).309 In Victoria, Western Australia and at the federal 
level, techniques were developed for ‘devolved’ consultations, in which specialist and 
community groups facilitated the engagement of marginalised individuals and groups who 
would otherwise have been effectively excluded from participation. Each of the Australian 
consultations was run by an independent committee, usually comprising four people 
nominated on a cross-party basis and with diverse backgrounds (including a Jesuit priest, a 
basketball player and a poet) (Developing a Bill of Rights, p. 29-31).  
 
The Northern Ireland process shared the emphasis on community participation but was 
considerably more protracted and necessarily reactive to political circumstances (Developing 
a Bill of Rights, pp. 17-21).310 The consultation was run by the Northern Ireland Human 
Rights Commission (NIHRC), as mandated by the 1998 Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement. 
Starting in 2000, it involved, among other methods, the training of some 400 community 
facilitators; targeted consultations with community-based groups of women, and children and 
young people; advertising campaigns on television, radio, billboards and bus-shelters; and 
other educational and promotional work carried out jointly with civil society networks such 
as the Human Rights Consortium, which was formed in 2000 to promote community 
engagement.311 Another key development was the establishment in 2006 of the Bill of Rights 
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Forum, a negotiating body comprising political parties and civil society representatives under 
an international chair.312 Consensus proved elusive and the Forum’s recommendations to the 
NIHRC expressed divergent views on many issues. Informed by these recommendations and 
its own consultations, the NIHRC submitted its advice on a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights to 
the UK Government in December 2008.313 Each proposed right (including social and 
economic rights, environmental rights and victims’ rights) was explained and justified with 
reference to a detailed methodology.314 In November 2009, the Northern Ireland Office 
responded with a consultation paper which accepted only two of the proposed rights for 
inclusion; other rights and enforcement issues were either discarded or left open for 
consultation.315 The NIHRC criticised the three-month consultation as belated and inadequate 
for a constitutional enterprise of such significance.316    
   
 Drawing on this experience, I present below the principles which I propose should 
underpin bills of rights processes, and connect to these to specific aspects of the design of 
process which are most likely to fulfil the recommended principles.   
 
a. Non-regression 
I argue (Developing a Bill of Rights, pp. 22-25) that a bill of rights process should be non-
regressive. All modern bills of rights have been designed to incorporate international human 
rights into domestic law and/or to strengthen existing human rights protection.317 No 
processes that I have reviewed permitted even the possibility of regression, either in terms of 
standards or mechanisms and institutions for protecting human rights. This approach is 
consistent with the principle of non-regression established by UN bodies that monitor states’ 
compliance with their international human rights obligations. In broad terms, this requires 
that standards of protection that have been adopted should not be undone at a later date 
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without compelling justification.318 I conclude that a process premised on weakening human 
rights protection would disturb these norms and set a damaging precedent internationally. 
 
The principle of non-regression goes to the heart of the relationship between human rights 
and democracy and reflects a view of bills of rights as not only negative instruments to 
constrain the state, but also positive instruments to enable relatively powerless groups to exert 
influence in the democratic process. On this account, a utilitarian calculus that justifies the 
weakening of human rights protection (or countenances that possibility) on the grounds that it 
expresses the majority will, or protects society at large, is spurious. Rather, the democratic 
imperative is to construct a process which facilitates participation by groups whose rights are 
most vulnerable to abuse. To fulfil this principle, I propose that governments initiating the 
formation of a bill of rights should enshrine the principle of non-regression in the terms of 
reference for the process of creating it.   
 
b. Transparency 
Politicians should be transparent about the purpose of a bill of rights and the terms of 
reference for the process by which they propose to create it (Developing a Bill of Rights, pp. 
22-25). This entails a clear procedural commitment to act on the results of public consultation 
and deliberation within certain parameters which must be clearly stated and justified. The 
methods employed to consult the public must also be transparent and open to scrutiny and 
those designing the process should explain the advantages and disadvantages of the chosen 
approach.  
 
Bills of rights processes are necessarily constrained by what is considered legally and 
politically feasible in terms of the possible substantive outcome(s). In Developing a Bill of 
Rights (pp. 25-29), I examine differences of approach in different jurisdictions as to how 
these constraints should be managed. Some consultation bodies favoured a clear statement of 
intent from government about what options it favours, since it is disempowering and 
distracting for people to be consulted about outcomes which are politically unattainable. 
Others favoured the inclusion of options that do not have elite support, as long as they are 
non-regressive.  
 
Whichever approach is taken, I suggest that transparency should extend to the final 
outcome of the consultation process, including recommendations as to whether or not to 
create a bill of rights and as to its content. The consultative body should set out a clear 
rationale for the inclusion of specific provisions and how these relate to the balance of views 
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obtained via consultation or deliberation, as well as to international standards (Developing a 
Bill of Rights, pp. 47-50). The rationale is likely to require an explanation of the weight given 
to certain types of submissions. Research participants who had run such exercises noted that 
submissions may need to be assessed qualitatively as well as quantitatively; e.g. to give 
appropriate significance to detailed submissions and those from organisations with large 
memberships as compared to ‘tick box’ responses from individuals, and to give particular 
weight to the views of groups who face an unusual level of disadvantage or discrimination.   
 
c. Independence  
I argue that the credibility of a bill of rights process is likely to be enhanced if it is 
independent of government and has no vested interest in the outcome (Developing a Bill of 
Rights, pp. 29-32). While the government will set the framework for the consultation and 
provide its resources, the process should not be owned by ministers or be manipulated for 
partisan ends. These considerations lead me to conclude that the independent committee 
model developed in Australia has significant advantages over the options of processes being 
run either by national human rights institutions (NHRIs) (as in Northern Ireland) or by 
government (as in the UK and New Zealand) or a parliamentary committee (as in Canada).  
NHRIs may be viewed as having a vested interest in the outcome of the consultation and are 
better suited to a role of influencing and monitoring the process; championing key principles; 
generating public engagement; speaking authoritatively about human rights and engaging in 
‘myth-busting’. Government- or parliament-run consultations have tended to be more 
conventional and static in their methods than independently-run processes and significantly 
less able to generate community engagement. Such processes may also be more vulnerable to 
becoming a proxy for other political battles than in the relative safe haven of an independent 
exercise. 
 
d. Inclusivity  
I propose (Developing a Bill of Rights, pp. 35-41) that bills of rights should strive to be 
participatory, using consultative methods and sometimes also deliberative ones.319 The 
process should place a high premium on eliciting the views and experiences of groups whose 
human rights are most vulnerable to being breached, and should give those voices due weight 
in the analysis of responses. Any process should also include meaningful efforts to elicit the 
views of groups who are most alienated or marginalised from the legal and political system 
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(as was achieved in Australia and Northern Ireland). Further, the process should be inclusive 
in respect of different geographical areas and should respect the competency and self-
determination of sub-national authorities.  
 
The body running the process should be capable of facilitating community-level 
discussions as well as eliciting expert opinion. This will generally require combining 
qualitative and quantitative methods and providing multiple opportunities for people to 
participate. This imperative was captured by one research participant as meaning that the bill 
of process should be ‘an exercise in building citizenship rather than just market research’ 
(Developing a Bill of Rights, p. 84).  
 
Deliberative forums have been shown to engender public trust if they are adequately 
publicised, properly constructed to be representative and independent from government and if 
government gives clear procedural commitments to act on their recommendations 
(Developing a Bill of Rights, pp. 41-45). Of particular interest are ‘micro-forums’ that select 
participants by forms of statistical or random sampling to ensure their representativeness and 
design a safe environment where they can deliberate, sometimes over an extended period, on 
the basis of balanced and comprehensive information. In Developing a Bill of Rights, I 
examine the relative merits of deliberative polling (which was used in the ACT process) and 
the more extended model of ‘citizens’ assemblies’.320  I argue that deliberative forums should 
not be used in isolation from other channels of public engagement, but that they are a useful 
vehicle to inform public discussion and increase trust in the process.  
 
Other aspects of the design of process are likely to affect the degree of public 
engagement achieved. Once political conditions are considered propitious to invite public 
engagement in the formation of a bill of rights, it is desirable for the process to have a clear 
timeframe with, at some point, a momentum-building phase with the aim of generating 
interest even among those who were previously unengaged (Developing a Bill of Rights, pp. 
50-51). Further, the process should be adequately resourced so as to be appropriately 
ambitious for the stated purpose ((Developing a Bill of Rights, pp. 52).  The risk of a process 
that lacks political commitment and momentum is disillusionment and a lack of legitimacy 
for the outcome. 
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e. Education and information 
I argue (Developing a Bill of Rights, pp. 45-47) that consultation and deliberation should be 
as unconstrained as possible whilst being informed to the greatest possible extent about 
existing human rights protections and obligations and options for reform. I suggest that a 
time-limited consultation aimed principally at gauging public preferences is unlikely to fulfil 
a serious educational function in relation to human rights. However, a minimum requirement 
of such a process is the provision of impartial and accessible information (in appropriate 
formats and languages) and a concerted strategy, adhered to by all actors in the consultation, 
to correct misperceptions about human rights.     
 
(iii)  Achieving democratic legitimacy for a UK bill of rights  
In Developing a Bill of Rights and ‘Lessons from Overseas’, I evaluate the two post-HRA 
initiatives to create a UK bill of rights in the light of the principles and methods synthesised 
above.     
 
a. Consultation on a Bill of Rights and Responsibilities   
The first post-HRA initiative was the Labour government’s eleven month consultation on its 
2009 Green Paper on a Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, which was run by civil servants in 
the Ministry of Justice.321 The process was non-regressive in that it ruled out the options of 
repealing or resiling from the HRA, or making rights legally contingent on the exercises of 
personal responsibility (Developing a Bill of Rights, pp. 61). It consisted partly of a series of 
deliberative events held around Britain, at which a total of around 500 randomly-selected 
participants debated national identity and values, a Bill of Rights and Responsibilities and a 
written constitution (Developing a Bill of Rights, pp. 58-65).322 However, these events were 
largely hidden from public view, which may be viewed as a missed opportunity to ignite 
broader interest in the process. The Ministry also held roundtable discussions with, among 
others, representatives of faith communities and disability organisations, as well as 
establishing a website and Twitter feed. The consultation process overall did not fulfil the 
principle of inclusivity as it did not attempt any thoroughgoing engagement with groups that 
might have experienced particular difficulties in contributing to it.   
 
The Ministry of Justice concluded that the consultation showed ‘strong public appetite’ 
for further debate on the consultation’s themes and ‘broad support’ for adoption of a Bill of 
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Rights and Responsibilities as part of a suite of constitutional changes.323  The assertion that 
public appetite was ‘strong’ is contestable: the process in fact took place largely unnoticed by 
the media and the wider public. While the consultation ‘reached’ a total of 2,500 people, 
including some 600 Twitter followers, only 123 submissions were received.324 This lacklustre 
response appears to bear out my research participants’ observations as to the deficiencies of 
government-administered consultation processes. The Labour government’s exercise had, one 
interviewee noted, made a new UK bill of rights appear to be ‘just another piece of 
legislation’ (Developing a Bill of Rights, p. 65). Moreover, I conclude, it had failed to 
overcome a sense of unease and disengagement with the bill of rights project in the devolved 
nations (Developing a Bill of Rights, Chapter 5). 
    
b. Consultation run by the Commission on a Bill of Rights  
In ‘Lessons from Overseas’, I evaluate the consultative process run by the Commission on a 
Bill of Rights in the light the principles elaborated above.  
 
The UK coalition parties entered the 2010 general election with divergent positions on 
human rights. The Conservative manifesto pledged to repeal the HRA and replace it with a 
new UK bill of rights;325 the Liberal Democrats were committed to the protecting the 
HRA.326 After negotiating these apparently incompatible positions, the coalition stated:  
 
We will establish a Commission to investigate the creation of a British Bill of Rights 
that incorporates and builds on all our obligations under the European Convention on 
Human Rights, ensures that these rights continue to be enshrined in British law, and 
protects and extends British liberties. We will seek to promote a better understanding 
of the true scope of these obligations and liberties.327 
 
This non-regressive mandate was plainly at odds with the Conservative manifesto 
pledge, and was widely interpreted as being intended to defer a potentially coalition-wrecking 
issue, creating a taint of bad faith about the process which, I suggest, any Commissioners 
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would have struggled to expunge.328 The coalition issued no clear statement about the 
purpose of a new UK bill of rights and gave no commitment to act upon the outcome of the 
Commission’s recommendations within certain parameters, thus failing to fulfil the principle 
of transparency proposed above.  
 
The Commission’s eight members (excluding the chair) were equally split between 
avowed supporters and detractors of the HRA, raising concerns in parliament – which proved 
well-founded - that the Commission would fail to reach a consensus.329 The Commission was 
also forced to defend itself against the accusation that it was insufficiently diverse, being 
comprised of eight white men and one white woman, almost all QCs, with two Scottish 
members and none based in Wales or Northern Ireland.330   
 
In August 2011, the Commission issued a ‘discussion paper’ inviting responses to the 
question of whether the UK needs a bill of rights and, if so, what it should contain and how it 
should apply to the devolved nations.331 The document provided a factual description of the 
UK’s human rights and constitutional architecture but omitted any discussion of what a bill of 
rights might entail, why it might be needed or how it might relate to the HRA. Nevertheless, 
the consultation elicited some 900 submissions.332 In July 2012, the Commission issued a 
second consultation document, more substantial and discursive than the first.333 It elicited 
more than 2,000 submissions.334 Thus, the consultation generated a much greater response 
than the Labour consultation on a Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, reflecting perhaps the 
heightened political discord surrounding the HRA and the ECtHR. Yet the consultation 
proved as unsuccessful as its predecessor at reaching out to marginalised and disadvantaged 
constituencies or generating momentum behind the project from civil society groups or the 
wider public. Minutes of the Commission’s meetings betray a tension between the ambitious 
community outreach that some Commissioners aspired to conduct and constraints imposed by 
their budget.335    
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c. The context of devolution 
In Developing a Bill of Rights (Chapter 5), I address the implications of devolution for the 
bill of rights project. Convention rights are deeply embedded into the UK constitutional 
framework within which devolved powers are exercised in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland. Convention rights as contained in the HRA form part of the devolution statutes;336 
and the devolved institutions have no competence to act in a manner that is contrary to 
Convention rights.337 The devolved Scottish Parliament and Northern Ireland Assembly have 
no power to amend the HRA;338 and the devolution statutes contain mechanisms similar to 
those in the HRA, such as the requirement under section 3 of the HRA to interpret legislation 
consistently with Convention rights.339 As a result, any amendment or repeal of the HRA 
would either have to leave Convention rights applicable to areas of policy within devolved 
competence, or else alter the fundamental structure of the devolution settlements.340 This 
would, in turn, give rise to complex constitutional questions in each of the devolved nations. 
These questions are especially acute in Northern Ireland: a decision to repeal the HRA, or to 
amend the HRA and/or enact a UK bill of rights covering Northern Ireland in a way which 
diminished existing human rights protection, would be likely to breach the Good Friday 
Agreement (Developing a Bill of Rights, p. 75). Further, it may put the UK in breach of its 
international treaty obligations owed to the Republic of Ireland as one of the guarantors of the 
Agreement. I argue in Developing a Bill of Rights (pp. 78-81) that the bill of rights ‘project’ 
also has significant political implications. In particular, it risks being seen as a move to 
centralise power, values and identity - at odds with devolution processes which are rooted in 
recognition of the multi-national character of the UK and the principle of self-determination. 
 
The Chair of the Commission on a Bill of Rights, Sir Leigh Lewis, ventured at the 
outset that the Commission was ‘acutely conscious’ of the devolution dimension.341 The 
Commission met representatives of the devolved administrations and legislatures in two day 
visits to each nation.342 It also established an Advisory Panel formed of individuals 
nominated by the devolved administrations.343 Members of this panel from Scotland and 
Wales ventured that a new UK bill of rights was being conceived primarily to address what 
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were perceived as ‘English problems’ and, ‘there was no view in Scotland and Wales that a 
UK Bill of Rights was necessary or desirable in order to address a perceived lack of public 
confidence in the current human rights system’.344 The Commission itself acknowledged that 
its consultations revealed that there was ‘little or no call’ for a new bill of rights in Scotland, 
Wales or Northern Ireland.345   
 
d. Assessing the  recommendations of the Commission on a Bill of Rights 
Since my research was published, the Commission on a Bill of Rights has issued its report. It 
is striking that the majority of members based its recommendation to create a new bill of 
rights principally on its perception of the degree of public alienation from the HRA;346 as 
well as the strident and polarised nature of disagreement about the current structures which, it 
suggested, call for a ‘fresh beginning’.347 This was despite the fact that a majority of 
respondents to the Commission’s two consultation documents were in favour of retaining the 
HRA.348 The majority report correctly observes that respondents to the consultations, being 
self-selecting, may not represent public opinion; and that polling data is ‘notoriously 
unreliable’, with contradictory results reflecting the phrasing of questions, among other 
factors (see also section 4.1 (iii)).349 However, the very unreliability of numerical measures of 
public opinion means that the Commission’s majority is unable to adduce evidence beyond 
the anecdotal for its view that the HRA is irretrievably unpopular.  
   
In Developing a Bill of Rights and ‘Lessons from Overseas’, I concluded that the 
frequently ill-informed and tendentious discourse surrounding a possible new bill of rights 
was incommensurate with the gravity and complexity of the project. Public enthusiasm for a 
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new bill of rights had not been established, particularly in the devolved nations; and nor had 
public antagonism towards the HRA been demonstrated to be entrenched or irrecoverable. I 
argued that much political (and especially Conservative) discourse about the need for a new 
bill of rights was predicated on the assertion that the UK does not already have one. This 
assertion obscured both the origins and the nature of the HRA and had produced ill-informed 
debate about the options available. I concluded that the conditions to create a bill of rights 
were highly unfavourable.   
 
 I see no cause to revise this assessment in the light of subsequent developments. It is 
not evident why a new bill of rights that fulfilled the Commission’s non-regressive mandate 
would necessarily enjoy a greater sense of popular ownership than the HRA, unless the 
underlying reasons for the unpopularity of the Act were addressed. I conclude that 
cosmetically ‘rebranding’ of the Act (for example, as being based on ‘British’ values) or 
tinkering with its provisions is unlikely to shift public attitudes or understanding and would, 
in any event, be an insufficient basis to embark on a process of significant constitutional 
change. 
 
4.3  Human rights, equality and religion or belief  
Legal judgments concerning human rights or equality and religion or belief have been 
especially contentious in Britain in recent years.350 In this section – drawing on my Religion 
or Belief report and the article ‘Advancing Debate about Religion or Belief’ - I examine the 
origins and nature of this controversy and propose ways in which debate might be shifted 
onto more constructive ground.351 My focus is on the way in which legal standards and 
judgments concerning religion or belief have been understood and invoked in public 
discourse.  
 
(i) The  nature of the controversy   
Public discussion of equality, human rights and religion or belief in Britain has assumed a 
rancorous tone in recent years. There has been strident commentary by some newspapers352 
and Christian clerics353 about the purported intention of proponents of the ‘secular’ values of 
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equality and human rights to drive faith out of public life. Groups advancing competing 
claims for protection under anti-discrimination law have traded accusations of 
totalitarianism354 and bigotry.355 In particular, as Stychin observes, ‘the construction of rights 
in conflict and in need of balancing pervades the relationship of sexuality and religion’.356  
 
Beneath this antagonistic rhetoric lies a more temperate, yet anxious, discussion about 
the way in which courts and tribunals have adjudicated equality- or human rights-based 
claims concerning religion or belief. Some legal scholars, commentators and human rights 
organisations have criticised decisions made both by domestic courts and the ECtHR.    
 
The main thrust of this critique (as discussed in Religion or Belief, Chapter 6) is that the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, enshrined in Article 9 ECHR, has been 
insufficiently and erratically protected in the courts. Courts, it is suggested, have taken such a 
cautious approach to protecting the manifestation of religion or belief that the law has come 
to protect only a restrictive and conservative form of religious life. 357 In this regard, it is 
argued, domestic courts have ‘essentially tracked the limitations of the Strasbourg 
approach’358 to claims based on religion or belief, albeit with occasional misgivings.359 In 
particular,  the argument continues, domestic courts have been increasingly ready to establish 
that Article 9(1) has not been interfered with, thereby short-circuiting any need to consider 
the merits of each case in detail using the criteria for justification under Article 9(2).360 This 
has sometimes involved courts inappropriately assuming the role of theological arbiter over 
an applicant’s beliefs by seeking to determine whether particular beliefs or practices are 
prescribed by the particular religion or belief.361 Particular controversy has surrounded cases 
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concerning whether employees (such as registrars or relationship therapists)362 or religious 
organisations (such as a Roman Catholic adoption agency)363 can refuse to provide a service 
which conflicts with their religious views where this may result in discrimination against 
others.  Some Christian commentators venture that these and other legal judgments both 
demonstrate and perpetuate an anti-religious – and specifically anti-Christian – bias in public 
life.364  
 
As one measure of the contentiousness of certain judgments, the former president of the 
ECtHR, Nicolas Bratza, notes that the Court was ‘flooded by an exceptional number’ of 
third-party requests to intervene in four UK cases brought by Christian claimants.365  These 
interventions – coming from perspectives as far apart as the National Secular Society366 and 
the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Carey367 – remind us that criticism of judicial 
decision-making on religion or belief is by no means unanimous. For some authors, far from 
enjoying too little legal protection, religion or belief may enjoy too much.368 McColgan 
proposes an attenuated form of protection against discrimination on grounds of religion or 
belief due to the inevitability of conflict between these and other protected characteristics 
under equality legislation, in particular sex and sexual orientation.369 Vickers argues that the 
emergence of a de facto hierarchy between different protected characteristics (with religion or 
belief enjoying a lower level of protection) ‘may be inevitable given the lack of consensus 
over so many issues regarding religion’.370   
 
                                                          
362
 Ladele v London Borough of Islington [2009] EWCA Civ 1357 and McFarlane v Relate Avon Ltd [2010] 
EWCA Civ 880. 
363
 Catholic Care (Diocese of Leeds) v Charity Commission for England and Wales [2012] UKUT 395 (TCC). 
364
 The Christian Institute argues that there is a ‘growing feeling that “equality and diversity” is code for 
marginalising Christian beliefs’; Christian Institute (2009) Marginalising Christians: Instances of Christians 
Being Sidelined in Modern Britain (Newcastle-upon Tyne: Christian Institute) p. 5.  
365
 N. Bratza (2012) ‘The “precious asset”: freedom of religion under the European Convention on Human 
Rights’ Ecclesiastical Law Journal 14(2): 256, p. 270. 
366
 Lord Lester of Herne Hill QC, R. McCrea and M. Schaeffer, ‘Application nos. 48420/10 and 59842/10  
Eweida and Chaplin v the United Kingdom, Application nos. 51671/10 and 36516/10 Ladele and McFarlane v 
the United Kingdom - Submissions on behalf of the National Secular Society’, 14 September 2011.    
367
 Lord Carey has gone so far as to call for a separate court structure for religious cases in order to ensure the 
involvement of judges who have a ‘proven sensibility to religious issues’. See McFarlane v Relate Avon [2010] 
EWCA Civ 880, paras. 16-18. 
368
 A. Lester and P. Uccellari (2008) ‘Extending the Equality Duty to Religion, Conscience and Belief: Proceed 
with Caution’ European Human Rights Law Review 5: 567. 
369
 A. McColgan (2009) ‘Class Wars? Religion and (In)equality in the Workplace’, Industrial Law Journal 
38(1): 1. 
370
 L. Vickers (2010) 'Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: An Emerging Hierarchy?' Ecclesiastical Law 
Journal 12(3): 280, pp. 301-302. 
87 
 
These arguments and counter-arguments reflect a degree of instability at the heart of the 
legal framework surrounding religion or belief. This is perhaps unsurprising. In the past 
decade, both the quantity and reach of the law have expanded significantly as the state seeks 
both to protect and regulate religious life in the context of a pluralistic society. The law 
prohibiting discrimination on grounds of religion or belief is also of recent origin and the 
inclusion of religion or belief alongside other protected characteristics in the Equality Act 
2010 has, I argue, stretched legal concepts in often uncomfortable ways. Sandberg refers to 
these developments as the ‘juridification of religion’, one consequence being that litigation is 
increasingly being resorted to or invoked as a means of addressing conflicts and seeking to 
influence policy.371   
 
(ii) The social significance of legal judgments   
In the article ‘Advancing Debate about Religion or Belief’ (pp. 55-57), I argue that debate 
about religion or belief in Britain has become unduly dominated by particular - and 
sometimes partial - understandings of legal judgments. Further, I suggest that judgments are 
mistakenly adduced as evidence of wider patterns of experience or behaviour. This 
phenomenon is especially striking in the debate about whether Christians in Britain (and 
other parts of Europe) are being marginalised. Many Christian participants in my research 
appeared to base their view that Christianity is being marginalised principally on their 
interpretation of a number of legal judgments, rather than on other types of social scientific 
evidence.372 Conversely, I argue that legal cases are not necessarily representative of common 
experience or a reliable indicator of the place of religion or belief (or specific religions or 
beliefs) in society. Indeed, the opposite is likely to be true. There are invariably contingent 
reasons why certain cases come to court and others do not. Meritorious claims may not reach 
court because individuals do not wish to litigate or lack the means to do so. Unmeritorious 
claims may reach court because of the persistence of individual claimants or the backing of 
campaign groups.373  
 
Further, my research suggests that public responses to certain high-profile cases make 
tensions between religion or belief and other interests appear more prevalent or intractable 
                                                          
371
 Sandberg, Law and Religion, as above n 357, p. 194.  
372
 For example, Dr Don Horrocks of the Evangelical Alliance, argued that, ‘the human rights and equality 
agenda is being used as a blunt instrument to silence religion … through legal decisions in the courts’ 
(‘Advancing Debate about Religion or Belief, p. 55).    
373
 See, for example, Haye v London Borough of Lewisham ET Case No. 3301852/2009, 16 June 2010, 
concerning a council employee who was dismissed for sending an email from her workplace account to 
Reverend Sharon Ferguson of the Lesbian and Gay Christian Movement, which the tribunal described (at para. 
36) as ‘highly offensive, homophobic … aggressive and violent’. It was submitted by the Christian Legal Centre 
on behalf of the claimant that the email was a legitimate expression of her religious beliefs - arguments that 
found no favour with the tribunal. 
88 
 
than they actually are. For example, the conspicuousness of certain cases concerning religious 
individuals who have been prevented from wearing or displaying religious symbols at work 
might suggest that such instances are widespread or increasing; this perception is not 
supported by data from Employment Tribunals.374 Misrepresentation of judgments is 
especially likely where understanding is reliant upon media reports or the messages of 
campaigning groups and is not also informed by the detailed circumstances of each case, the 
legal reasoning and the wider sociological context. Judgments may be given a more 
expansive meaning or significance in public discourse than the facts of the case warrant.375  
 
Further, I establish that the outcome of cases is often unpredictable and may appear 
contradictory. This is partly due to the reliance on the principle of proportionality in assessing 
whether interference or disadvantage is justified in a given case. Even within a single national 
context (and still more at the Council of Europe level), it is perilous to ‘read across’ from one 
judgment to another because each case is highly fact- and context-specific.376 For example, it 
may appear difficult to reconcile why one employment tribunal held that a Muslim security 
guard did not suffer indirect discrimination when his employer refused him permission to 
leave work early on a Friday;377 while another held that a Christian care worker did suffer 
indirect discrimination when her employer introduced a rota requiring her to work on 
Sundays.378 In the former, the disadvantage was held to be a proportionate means of 
achieving a legitimate aim; in the latter, it was not. In other instances, judgments may 
actually be contradictory or inconsistent. For example, the notion that voluntary submission 
to a system of norms such as a contract of employment creates a ‘specific situation’ which 
limits the claimant’s right to manifest their religion or belief has been applied inconsistently 
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over time by the ECtHR, while recent domestic judgments which apply the rule restrictively 
are at odds with recent Strasbourg judgments which chose to disregard it.379 
 
I conclude that legal judgments need to be contextualised with other types of evidence 
in order to determine what (if any) social significance they have. Weller’s review of research 
evidence about religious discrimination in Britain in the past decade notes the growth in 
recent years of ‘at least concerns and claims about discrimination in relation to Christians’ 
but finds no evidence to substantiate such claims at a societal level.380 By contrast, a 
consistent body of research evidence suggests that in Britain, Muslims experience 
discrimination of a greater frequency and seriousness than any other religious group.381 The 
nature and extent of discrimination against Christians in the UK has not been 
comprehensively studied (save for studies of sectarian prejudice against particular forms of 
Christianity) but is likely to vary with, among other factors, class, ethnicity, geography and 
type of Christianity.382 At a minimum, this suggests the need for a more nuanced analysis of 
the incidence of discrimination against Christians and its causes than the generalised 
‘marginalisation’ narrative presently articulates. Further, it suggests that considerable caution 
is required when seeking to generalise from specific legal judgments and to ascribe them with 
social, as well as legal, significance.   
 
(iii) Advancing debate about religion or belief  
My research (Religion or Belief, Chapter 10) proposes various means of advancing public 
discussion about religion or belief beyond its current, rancorous state, which I summarise 
below. 
 
a. Areas of consensus 
First, I argue that divisive currents of debate should not be permitted to obscure the areas of 
law and policy where there is (or is potential for) consensus. Practice and understanding are 
likely to be advanced if these areas can be identified and, as far as possible, insulated from 
more acrimonious discussion. One area of broad agreement among my research participants 
was the criteria for deciding whether exceptions to general rules or practices should or should 
not be made on the basis of a person’s religion or belief where there is no conflict with the 
equally-protected rights of others; e.g., in relation to religious dress or symbols; working 
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patterns; the provision of facilities; or the meeting of dietary requirements. Virtually all 
participants acknowledged that individuals whose religion or belief is important to them have 
a responsibility to make sensible career choices and may have to make personal sacrifices to 
avoid conflict with the law or professional guidelines, especially where conflict is 
foreseeable. Criteria which were advanced by many participants as potentially legitimate 
reasons for restricting the manifestation of religion or belief include genuine health or safety 
concerns and requirements for corporate uniformity and business efficiency. Another broadly 
accepted criterion was the need to avoid detrimental impact on colleagues.  
 
There was a presumption towards the accommodation of religion or belief where these 
criteria do not apply or are not compelling. Participants generally acknowledged that 
decisions about what it is reasonable to accommodate are always fact-specific and may 
involve nuanced judgments as to the social context involved. These responses indicate a high 
degree of acceptance of the desirability of what might be termed ‘routine’ accommodation of 
the manifestation of religion or belief in the workplace, where there is no conflict with the 
rights of others. This finding stands in stark contrast to approaches elsewhere in Europe, 
where there is frequent controversy around the implementation of non-discrimination 
provisions relating to dress codes and religious symbols.383 
 
 Another area of broad agreement between research participants of different 
backgrounds and affiliations was the undesirability of pursuing litigation except as a last 
resort and in matters of strategic importance (Religion or Belief, pp. 119-21). Virtually all 
interviewees viewed litigation as symptomatic of failure, whoever instigated it. A litigious 
environment was viewed by many research participants (including employers and trade 
unions) as inimical to proportionate and balanced decision-making: threats or fear of 
litigation were seen as likely to produce knee-jerk responses, which tended to polarise and 
harden divisions. Allied to concern about the potentially negative consequences of litigation 
(or threats of litigation) was the view that the law is limited in its capacity to address complex 
questions of multiculturalism and social identity (Religion or Belief, pp. 121-24).   
 
b. Alternatives to litigation 
If litigation is to be used selectively, there is a requirement to pre-empt or resolve disputes 
relating to religion or belief by other means, such as conciliation, mediation or negotiation. 
These approaches are, of course, not peculiar to disputes connected to religion or belief. 
However, the existential importance of religions or beliefs to some of their adherents, and the 
evident potential for tension with other equality strands, may make such disputes appear 
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intractable and in greater need of principled approaches to resolution, whether in the 
workplace or community.  
 
In ‘Advancing Debate about Religion or Belief’, I endorse the approach of Stychin, 
who argues that conditions - or ‘ethical rules of engagement’ – should be attached to entry 
into the public sphere.384 He suggests that acceptance of these conditions is a minimum 
requirement for groups or individuals who seek to negotiate a particular outcome in a context 
where competing interests are at stake. Stychin proposes as one response an approach based 
on human rights. Specifically, he argues for a model of rights based on ‘democratic dialogue 
and compromise’, in which nuanced analysis of the context in each case is preferable to 
abstract determinations on how to balance competing rights or the pursuit of victory in a 
‘zero-sum game’.  
 
c. Ground rules for the conduct of debate 
The contextual analysis proposed by Stychin requires us to elaborate the ‘rules of 
engagement’ according to which public deliberation about conflicting interests or worldviews 
is to be pursued. The possible content of these ground rules was explored among participants 
in my research and was an area in which they broadly concurred (Religion or Belief, pp. 134-
38).  
 
The ‘ground rule’ most frequently invoked by interviewees was: ‘Do no harm’. At a 
general level, this principle suggests a position of mutual restraint, according to which 
individuals or groups refrain from asserting human rights or equality claims if to do so entails 
harm to others; for example, because it compromises health and safety or places an undue 
burden on colleagues. In the context of the workplace, asking the question ‘What is the 
harm?’ was considered a useful means of distinguishing situations in which requests for the 
accommodation of particular beliefs or practices are refused by decision-makers for 
compelling reasons as opposed to merely a disinclination to embrace religious difference. 
 
Several interviewees proposed as a ‘rule of thumb’ the recognition that religions are 
important to their adherents.385 It was argued that religion was too often viewed as an impulse 
that perpetually threatens to overspill into irrationality or conflict and that therefore needs to 
be constrained. This observation does not necessarily entail protection of religious believers 
from offence; however, it establishes at minimum a respect for the intrinsic value of religions 
to their adherents.  
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 Another broadly-agreed proposition was that individuals should be free to pursue their 
own preferences subject only to reasonable limitations imposed in the interests of others. 
The principle of personal autonomy was given nuanced interpretation by many of our 
participants. It was acknowledged that it will sometimes have to be balanced against the 
integrity of the organisation and the imperative to achieve its objectives. Organisational 
imperatives were, in turn, considered to include the promotion of diverse and hospitable 
workplaces in respect of religion or belief as well as other characteristics. Such diversity was 
generally considered to be of inherent value to all employees and to organisations as a whole.  
  
 Yet another proposed ‘rule of engagement’ was the requirement to respect the integrity 
of the position of each party to a dispute, since impugning the motives of others tends to 
foreclose any possibility of dialogue. 
 
 In ‘Advancing Debate about Religion or Belief’ (pp. 69-71), I conclude that the ground 
rules which commanded consensus among my research participants - though generally 
expressed in non-legal terms - are broadly congruent with the core principles established in 
international human rights law which inform the assessment of the legitimacy of any 
restriction to the freedom of religion or belief. These may be outlined as follows. In addition 
to requirements of legality, necessity and proportionality, any restriction should be non-
discriminatory in the sense that it should not bear more directly or more harshly on the 
followers of one religion or belief than of another.386 The state is required to act in a neutral 
fashion as between religions and as between religious and non-religious forms of belief.387 
The fostering of pluralism and tolerance is a seen as a goal in its own right as a means of 
preserving democracy; it requires religious adherents to accept a fairly high degree of 
challenge to their belief systems in the pursuit of this goal.388 Human rights law has also 
established the principle of respect for the right of others to believe, i.e. the duty of the state 
to create a ‘level playing field’ between different parties, with one side being free to present 
its point of view, and the other to reject it. This principle might also be expressed as 
respecting the ‘believer’ rather than the ‘belief’.389  
 
 These principles provide decision-makers with a substantive set of positive values that 
might underpin their policy and practice. My research indicates that, in Britain, these are 
likely to be broadly accepted, whether or not they are expressly labelled as originating in 
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human rights law. This finding, however tentative, suggests that there are grounds for 
optimism that the embittered tone of discussion about religion or belief in public life can be 
shifted into one which is more constructive. It further suggests that those on the ‘front line’ of 
decision-making about the complex social and political challenges posed by multiculturalism 
and identity politics are not, in fact, judges, but decision-makers in public authorities and 
workplaces. It is school governors, workplace managers and town hall officers whose 
decisions may need to withstand considerable scrutiny lest they find their way into legal 
process. This implies, I argue, a focus on the use of human rights standards and principles, as 
well as equality law, as a framework for day-to-day decision-making – on implementation 
rather than litigation. A further imperative is the provision of accurate and balanced 
information about the principles established in specific judgments and their implications for 
decision-makers.390  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
In part 4, I have examined areas of persistent controversy surrounding the application and 
impact of the HRA. My research reveals that dissensus on human rights in the UK is wide-
ranging in origin and traverses the ‘fault lines’ of deep social and political divisions. These 
include the relationship between the individual and the wider community, commonly invoked 
through the lens of ‘rights and responsibilities’; the tension between individual liberty and 
collective security; and notions of the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’. Other fault lines 
concern the relationship between the nation state and Europe; between parliament and the 
courts and more broadly between democracy and human rights.  
 
Human rights (as well as equality law) have also become a prime venue for the 
negotiation of religious and cultural differences. Indeed, debate about human rights in the UK 
has been likened with some justification to a ‘pale version of the American culture wars’, in 
the sense that fundamental conflicts between ideas and values are played out in the language 
(whether positive or negative) of human rights.391 The HRA and the ECtHR have felt the full 
shock of their position on these various fault lines.  
  
5. OVERALL CONTRIBUTION OF RESEARCH  
 
Within the turbulent context identified above, the contribution of my research has been to 
advance both empirical knowledge and normative argument about the implementation and 
impact of human rights law in the UK. My preoccupation with the application of human 
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rights standards and principles in public services provides a necessary counter-weight to a 
political narrative about rights which is otherwise dominated by the purported tension 
between human rights and the public interest. My analysis of the impact of judicial review on 
the behaviour of public authorities, and the more subtle ways in which human rights 
standards and principles influence decision-making and catalyse organisational change, form 
an indispensable part of this alternative narrative.  
 
In addition, my research has established that the conduct of debate about human rights 
has frequently fallen short of the requirements of open and reasoned justification which I 
established in section 1.1 as integral to my conceptual framework. This analysis underpins 
my conclusion that conditions for the creation of a new bill of rights for the UK are highly 
unpropitious. My research contributes to existing empirical and theoretical research which 
seeks to advance debate about human rights in the UK based on a more coherent vision of 
democratic constitutionalism. This approach eschews the ‘either/or’ dichotomy between 
parliamentary sovereignty and judicial supremacy and examines instead how different public 
actors should fulfil their legitimate and necessary roles in the shared enterprise of protecting 
and promoting the realisation of human rights. 
 
6. CURRENT AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
I am presently co-authoring (with Philip Leach) a book to be published by Oxford University 
Press on the role of national parliaments in the implementation of ECtHR judgments. This 
will present the findings of qualitative research funded by the Nuffield Foundation and 
undertaken in 2012-13 in Ukraine, Romania, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. The 
book will examine the nature and extent of parliamentary involvement in the implementation 
of judgments in the selected Council of Europe states, as well as engaging with normative 
arguments about the legitimacy of universal or regional human rights systems and theories of 
state compliance with international norms. In relation to the themes addressed in this 
statement, it is hoped that the book will help to advance discussion in the UK about the 
democratic legitimacy of the Strasbourg Court beyond its present rancorous and parochial 
state; first, by situating the debate about the Court’s relationship with national authorities 
within the context of the Council of Europe as a whole, and secondly by examining the 
normative value of involving parliamentarians in the implementation of human rights 
judgments with respect to legitimation, transparency and public participation.  
 
 I am also co-editing a collection on the harmonisation of international human rights law, 
to be published by Brill (Martinus Nijhoff) as part of the Nottingham Studies on Human 
Rights series. The aim of the book is to explore the extent to which the jurisprudence and 
procedures of the regional and international legal systems for the protection of human rights 
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takes into account different sources of law and practice when developing their own 
jurisprudence and practice, the extent of any differences and whether those differences are 
justified (and if so, on what basis).   
 
I am keen to continue my UK-focused research on human rights, not least as a 
contribution to informed debate in advance of the 2015 election in which the future of the 
HRA is likely to be a prominent issue. The evident variation of human rights debate in 
different parts of the UK requires a methodology which takes account of differences in the 
legal and policy environment relating to devolved and non-devolved decision-making. 
Evaluative research (of the type discussed in section 3.4) will be of particular value in 
determining the impact of human rights-based practice. This is likely to require intensively 
focused research in one or two public authorities where human rights have been integrated 
into decision-making over a period of time. Separately, there is also scope for broader 
research which might focus on the impact of the HRA on certain area/s of law, policy and 
practice or in particular localities. I suggest that such research should also take account of 
initiatives which are congruent with human rights (such as co-production of public services; 
see section 3.2 (ii)) and personalisation)392 and/or which are framed using principles such as 
respect for dignity,393 but which do not explicitly refer to or integrate human rights standards. 
The intention would not be to ‘claim’ such initiatives as evidence of impact of the HRA, but 
rather to explore how the express application of human rights standards (e.g., in relation to 
dignity, Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR) might strengthen or intersect with them.  
 
In addition to research focused on the HRA and the UK’s obligations under the 
Convention, I am interested in pursuing work which analyses the UK’s performance under its 
international human rights obligations (an interest I presently pursue as a Trustee of ‘Just 
Fair’, which raises awareness and conducts monitoring of the UK’s implementation of, in 
particular, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).   
 
  
                                                          
392
 Chetty, Dalrymple and Simmons, Personalisation and human rights, as above n 79. 
393
 See, e.g., Department of Health (2009) Dignity in Care Campaign Case Studies (London: Department of 
Health).   
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ANNEX A – LIST OF PUBLIC WORKS SUBMITTED 
 
Research reports 
 
• (2012) Religion or belief, equality and human rights in England and Wales, Research 
Report 84 (Manchester: Equality and Human Rights Commission) [with the assistance 
of Karen Bennett and Philip Leach] 
 
• (2012) Evaluating Human Rights-Based Interventions in Health and Social Care 
(London Metropolitan University: Human Rights and Social Justice Research 
Institute; produced for the Human Rights in Healthcare programme of the Department 
of Health).  
 
• (2012) The UK and the European Court of Human Rights Research Report 83 
(Manchester: Equality and Human Rights Commission) [with Jane Gordon and Philip 
Leach].   
 
• (2010) Developing a Bill of Rights for the UK, Research Report 51 (Manchester: 
Equality and Human Rights Commission) [with the assistance of Philip Leach and 
Andrew Puddephatt]. 
 
• (2009) Poverty, inequality and human rights: Do human rights frameworks make a 
difference? (York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation) [with Elizabeth Mottershaw]. 
 
• (2009) Evaluating the impact of selected cases under the Human Rights Act 1998 on 
public service provision (unnumbered) (Manchester: Equality and Human Rights 
Commission) [with Elizabeth Mottershaw]. 
 
• (2009) Human rights in Britain since the Human Rights Act 1998: a critical review, 
Research Report 28 (Manchester: Equality and Human Rights Commission) [with 
Philip Leach and Jenny Watson]. 
 
Peer reviewed journal articles   
 
• (2013) ‘Advancing debate about religion or belief, equality and human rights: 
Grounds for optimism?’, Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 2(1) 50-71. 
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• (2009) ‘Evaluating the Impact of Human Rights Litigation on Policy and Practice: A 
Case Study of the UK’, Journal of Human Rights Practice 1(3) 339-361 [with 
Elizabeth Mottershaw]. 
 
Book chapters 
 
• (2013) ‘Developing a Bill of Rights for the UK: Lessons from overseas’ in I. Leigh 
and R. Masterman (eds) The UK’s Statutory Bill of Rights: Constitutional and 
Comparative Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 281-307.    
 
• (2012) ‘Limits and achievements of the HRA from the socio-economic point of view: 
the HRA and Poverty’, in N. Kang-Riou, J. Milner and S. Nayak (eds), Confronting 
the Human Rights Act: Contemporary themes and perspectives (London: Routledge) 
141-158 [with Elizabeth Mottershaw].  
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ANNEX B – JOINT AUTHORSHIP AND COLLABORATION 
 
It is evident from the publications listed in Annex A that much of my work has been 
collaborative and/or involved joint authorship. Several of the publications are based on a 
substantial amount of original qualitative research, which in each case I conducted with one or 
two others. 
 
I have written four publications jointly with Elizabeth Mottershaw. The longer research 
reports (Poverty, Inequality and Human Rights and Evaluating the Impact of Selected Cases 
under the HRA) involved a clear division of labour: Elizabeth and I each researched and wrote 
a number of chapters before synthesising the complete text. The chapters that I wrote were as 
follows: 
 
• Poverty, Inequality and Human Rights: Introduction and chapters 1, 2, 3, 6. 
• Evaluating the Impact of Selected Cases under the HRA: Chapters 1, 5, 6 and 7. 
 
Our joint authorship of the book chapter ‘Limits and achievements of the HRA’ and 
journal article ‘Evaluating the Impact of Human Rights Litigation’ involved a more fluid 
division of labour, in which we each wrote sections and exchanged comments before finalising 
the whole.     
 
Two of the other research reports were jointly authored with other colleagues. In each 
case, I was responsible for bringing the final draft to publication. The details are as follows: 
 
• The UK and the European Court of Human Rights: I wrote the first drafts of the 
Executive Summary and Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 10. This was a truly collaborative 
process in which Philip Leach, Jane Gordon and I produced drafts chapters and then 
met to discuss them and agree revisions.   
• Critical Review: as stated in the Acknowledgements, I wrote the full draft of this 
report, with comments and contributions from Philip Leach and Jenny Watson.    
 
 Two of the research reports were written ‘with the assistance of’ others. This means that 
others were involved in conducting some of the primary research and/or providing comments 
on the final report. In each case, I wrote the full draft of the report and was responsible for 
bringing it to publication. The details are as follows: 
 
• Religion or Belief: I was the sole author of the report; Karen Bennett and Philip Leach 
were co-researchers and Philip provided comments on the final draft.  
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• Developing a Bill of Rights: I was the sole author of the report. Philip Leach and 
Andrew Puddephatt provided comments on the final draft.  
